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The impact of supervisory orders and structural interdicts in socio-
economic rights cases in South Africa 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The sentiment of Justice Ackerman that courts have a particular responsibility and 
obligation to “forge new tools” and shape innovative remedies to achieve a goal, is 
profound and based on a constitution with a transformative nature. The injustice of 
apartheid brought about unequal resource distribution in South Africa and this is well 
documented.  The need for innovative remedies to address these injustices has been in 
demand.  The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa has made available, sufficient 
remedies for the courts to deal with these concerns.  However, the courts need to find a 
creative way of using and applying these remedies.   One such remedy, being promoted 
by this paper is, structural interdicts with a supervisory jurisdiction.   This remedy has a 
process of meaningful engagement attached to it, to ensure all parties reach practical 
solutions to ongoing socio-economic rights violations.  The ancillary effect of these types 
of orders will promote future policies to take into consideration socio-economic rights 
needs of other people in the same position as the applicants.  The ongoing supervision 
of the court will further ensure that government comply with its obligation within 
reasonable time, and to address ongoing concerns of socio-economic rights violation as 
and when they arise during the process of engagement.  
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PART 1 
CHAPTER 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL CATEGORIES OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 
1.1  Introduction  
 
Addressing effective remedies in socio-economic rights cases is considered by many, 
to be an important mechanism in helping the most vulnerable people in society.   
The South African Constitution provides the Constitutional Court of South Africa 
(CCSA) with wide remedial powers, which will be fully discussed later in this paper. 
Socio-economic rights are explicitly included in chapter two of the Bill of Rights, of 
the South African Constitution, with the view of addressing the injustices of the 
past1.   This was evident during the negotiation process of the Constitution. A feature 
that stood out was the fact that a strong institutionalised opposition was the key to a 
sustainable democracy. Understandably, many negotiators were not alone in 
warning that the gravest danger to South African democracy would be the lack of a 
strong opposition to the African National Congress (ANC).  The drafters were aware 
that, with no strong opposition in sight in the near future, for the ANC, the 
Constitution had to be designed in such a way, to provide safeguard mechanisms, to 
promote a transformative constitution, in order to protect its citizens and to ensure 
fair resource distribution2.  
 These mechanisms must ensure that rights are not being violated, without 
reasonable justifiable limitation, to promote the values of an open and democratic 
                                                          
1
 See Christiansen E  “Adjudicating Non-Justifiable Rights: Socio-Economic Rights and the South 
African Constitutional Court” 38 (2007) Columbia Human Rights L. Rev 321, for a full discussion of the 
history and negotiating process that lead to the incorporation of socio-economic rights in the South 
African Constitution  
2
 Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism”  1998  SAJHR 146 
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society3.  The Constitution was rightfully perceived as an instrument to transform 
South African society from a society based on socio-economic deficiency, to one 
based on the equal distribution of available resources.  
The duties and responsibilities placed on the Constitutional Court of South Africa in 
socio-economic rights cases are enormous and there are very few guidelines to 
realise this duty. This could possibly seem like one reason why the first few socio-
economic rights cases, failed to provide remedies that enhanced socio-economic 
rights, to its full potential. This study seeks to address a way forward for the court to 
use a more creative way of using already-existing remedies for these rights, by 
merely performing a more practical function.   
The main focus of this paper is to present an understanding of how useful and 
practical structural interdicts, with a supervisory jurisdiction, can act as one effective 
remedy to ensure the fulfilment of compliance of the state’s obligation to socio-
economic rights.  This paper will further present a broader achievement context; it 
will demonstrate that proper meaningful engagement can result in better 
institutional policy infrastructures being put in place for socio-economics rights. The 
breach of these rights will then be dealt with by government directly via using the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA) first4.   PAJA is a law, which gives 
effect to rights by setting out people’s rights within administrative procedures. This 
process is to make sure that fair administrative procedure is adhered to and will 
result in citizens having an easier and quicker response to the infringed right being 
adhere to, ideally.     
However, this broader achievement can only be accomplished effectively if the CCSA 
provides proper benchmarks for these rights, whereby the state will be able to use 
the benchmarks as a foundation in their policy-drafting, in collaboration with their 
meaningful engagement process with the parties. 
                                                          
3
 Section 36 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
4
 See www.justice.gov.za/paja/new.htm (accessed on 2 May 2013) for a full discussion on PAJA  
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However, in order to set benchmarks, the CCSA must define the normative value 
(pertaining to giving directives) to these rights first.  Consequently, without an 
agreed methodology for setting benchmarks, states are left with wide discretion in 
setting their own benchmark standards. Fukuda-Parr, Lawson-Remer and Randolph 
have developed a theoretical model of an evidence-based methodology for 
estimating state performance where benchmarks are set, by using an innovative 
‘achievement possibilities frontier’ (APF)5. They developed the Social and Economic 
Rights Fulfilment Index (SERF Index) benchmark frontier, which uses data from up to 
2008, on socio-economic achievements of countries, for over the past 25 years, to 
identify the best performance standards in key aspects of economic and social rights. 
The focus of the index is on structural and process dimensions, such as making 
strong constitutional provisions or adopting appropriate legislative measures.  South 
Africa’s performance shows not only that many citizens do not enjoy socio-economic 
rights, but that state performance is well below what is potentially feasible with the 
level of overall development.  They concluded by saying that, South Africa may be a 
country that leads the world in constitutional commitments to economic and social 
rights, but South Africa is still faced with widespread poverty. 
From this discussion it seems clear that it has become important that serious 
consideration should be provided for effective remedies by the court. This being 
said, the starting point is to find an appropriate interpretation for socio-economic 
rights, it is submitted that meaningful engagement will provide the much-needed 
understanding of the socio-economic rights’ normative value. This process of 
participatory decision-making is arguably more capable of achieving just and 
sustainable solutions to particular problems because the participants are more 
                                                          
5
 ESR review Community Law Centre (University of the Western Cape) 2012 13 no 2 
www.communitylawcentre.org.za/clc-projects/socioeconomic-rights/esr-review-1 
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familiar to the local needs and uniqueness of their circumstances6.  This process of 
meaningful engagement will be discussed fully in chapter 3 of this paper.  
Firstly, chapter 1 will illustrate the important nature and function of socio-economic 
rights in a transformative constitution and its international protection.  It will further 
discuss the ICESCR and its ratification, which is submitted, to be a step in the right 
direction. The ICESCR provides the court with guidelines how to interpret certain 
provisions such as “minimum core” and “ within its full available resources” to 
mention only a few, however the courts willingness to incorporate the interpretation 
of these various concepts into a South African context is yet to be seen.  A brief 
discussion in this chapter will focus on the Doctrine of Separation of Power, it will be 
submitted that this doctrine has created concerns of institutional legitimacy and 
competency in judicial enforcement. However, it is the duty of the court to use its 
flexible powers to enforce duties and to remedy violations. 
 
1.2 The characteristics of socio-economic rights and its International Instruments 
Socio-economic rights encompass the material aspects of people’s basic needs, for 
survival and growth. The notion is that human beings cannot survive unless their 
basic needs of adequate shelter, sufficient food, water, education, health care, and 
social security are being satisfied.  For decades, socio-economic rights have been 
treated differently from civil and political rights.  Civil and political rights refer to the 
right to vote, the right to a fair trial and freedom of speech, movement and 
assembly, these rights are also recognised as first class rights. Civil and political rights 
receive more legal protection than socio-economic rights, as most of the civil and 
political rights have been codified in domestic statutes. Unlike socio-economic rights, 
or second class rights, they are regarded as having a much lower status than first 
                                                          
6
 Liebenberg S “Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human rights adjudication: 
The possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful engagement” (2012) 12 AHRJ 5 
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class rights7.  However, the United Nations has confirmed that socio-economic and 
civil and political rights are equally important, indivisible and interdependent8.  It is 
submitted that this view is correctly expressed as one cannot hope to participate in 
civil and political rights while there is a struggle to provide for food, healthcare and 
basic shelter.   
Countries such as Namibia, Ireland and India, made civil and political rights 
justiciable, but not socio-economic rights. In fact most common law countries adopt 
similar approaches. These rights are merely used as a directive principle for 
government9. It is gratefully accepted that International laws, norms and principles 
have had a profound effect in shaping the development of domestic human rights 
norms, and principles around the world10.  Fortunately, socio-economic rights are 
protected by a number of international instruments. The founding document of the 
protection of human rights is the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(Universal Declaration), under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN)11. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) consists of a comprehensive 
catalogue of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights12. The UDHR is 
universal in its content and application; however it is not part of binding 
international law, but it is still a potent instrument, used to apply moral and 
diplomatic pressure on states that violate the Declaration’s principles13. The UDHR 
states that all "human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights" and it 
serves as the driving force behind many human rights-based legislation. The UDHR 
sets a standard of achievement for all nations to strive for.  Even though the 
                                                          
7
 See Kapindu R “From the Global to the local. The role of international law in the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa” Socio-Economic rights project 6 (2009) Community Law Centre 
(University of the Western Cape). 
8
 Kapindu R (2009) 15  
9
  Khoza S “Socio-economic Rights In South Africa” A resource Book 2ed Community Law Centre  
(University of the Western Cape) 2007 
10
 Kapindu R (2009) 3 
11
 Liebenberg S “Engaging the paradoxes of the universal and particular in human rights adjudication: 
The possibilities and pitfalls of ‘meaningful engagement” (2012) 12 AHRJ 2 
12
 Kapindu R (2009) 10 
13
 www.unac.org/rights/question.html (access on 5 May 2013) 
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Declaration is not legally binding technically, there are no signatories to the 
Declaration. Instead, the Declaration was ratified through a proclamation by the 
General Assembly on 10 December 1948, with a count of 48 votes to none with only 
8 abstentions. This was considered a triumph as the vote unified very diverse, even 
conflicting political regimes. In addition, the Declaration has inspired the creation of 
subsequent international documents such as the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and has inspired the creation of subsequent international documents such 
as the International Bill of Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. 
The commission involved in drafting the UDHR also drafted two legally-binding 
covenants on human rights.   The two Covenants are the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Both were adopted by the General Assembly and were 
opened for signature in December 1966 and both came into effect in 1976. These 
primary covenants provide guidelines for domestic laws in South Africa. The 
International Covenants on Human Rights are treaties, and state parties undertook 
to respect, ensure and take steps for the full achievement of a wide range of rights14. 
 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter) is another 
instrument that identifies the universal desires of fundamental human rights. These 
instruments have created supervisory committees to monitor state compliances.  
The United Nations (UN) Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), 
monitors the implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC 
Committee), monitors the implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) these are all international human rights instrument15.  The CRC though, 
                                                          
14
 www.unac.org/rights/question.html (access on 5 May 2013) 
15
 Chirwa N M “Child poverty and children’s rights of access to food and basic nutrition in South Africa 
A contextual, jurisprudential and policy analysis” Community Law Centre (University of the Western 
Cape) 2009 2 
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protects civil, political rights and socio-economic rights in one treaty. The ICESCR, 
together with the UDHR and the ICCPR, are usually referred to as the International 
Bill of Rights. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) also deals directly with socio-economic rights of women.  
The ICESCR and the ICESCR has been regarded as the International Bill of Rights 
because of their binding status.  
The ICESCR has received approval on 10 October 2012 by the South African cabinet 
for ratification; it has been eighteen years since Nelson Mandela signed the ICESCR. 
Finally the provisions of the covenant will be legally binding on the state. However 
despite the approval, ratification has not yet taken place. 
Jackie Dugard, the executive director at the Socio-Economic Rights Institute of SA 
(SERI), welcomed the long-awaited decision but she observed that South Africa has 
already, for many years, adhered to the norms and standards contained in the 
ICESCR. South Africa, has ratified the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights 
of 1981, which echoes many of the socio-economic rights contained in the ICESCR16. 
The ICESCR indeed had a profound influence in shaping South Africa’s constitutional 
architecture insofar as socio-economic rights were concerned. The Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural rights (CESCR) has come up with an impressive 
catalogue of general comments on various socio-economic rights.  With regard to 
individual complaints, on 10 December 2008, the General Assembly unanimously 
adopted an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights which provides the Committee competence to receive and consider 
communications17.  
These international instruments are indeed the starting point of interpretation of 
socio-economic rights and the Constitution of South Africa gave these rights its 
                                                          
16
 Socio-Economic Rights Institute available at http:/www.seri-sa.org (access on 7 September 2012) 
17
 Kapindu R (2009) 14 
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function and character in the legal system, its justiciability makes socio-economic 
rights a demand for fulfilment. 
 
1.3 Socio-economic rights are justiciable 
The scope and interpretation of these full range of rights has been set out by many 
cases in the CCSA, and these rights are justiciable rights and legally enforceable, 
under the Constitution18. Certain states in the United States of America, have 
refused to acknowledge socio-economic rights as legally enforceable19.  Kirsty 
Mclean describes the notion of justiciable and enforceability as distinct, and she 
provides the following characteristics; enforceability she states, deals with the ability 
of the courts to develop a remedy to protect or enforce the interest or rights it 
wishes to protect and enforce, while justiciability concerns the question of whether a 
matter is suitable for judicial resolution20.   
The CCSA has received the Constitutional mandate to act as guardian and administer 
these rights to its full potential.   It further places a duty on the state to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil these rights in the Bill of Rights21.  It is submitted that 
these rights and duties create a relationship of check and balances between the two 
institutions, which should frequently be strengthened.    Later in this study, an 
overview of the court jurisprudence of the last seventeen years will provide a clearer 
understanding, of how the courts have interpreted this mandate and the effective 
implementation of court orders by the state will present whether the state’s duty 
has progressed.   
                                                          
18
 Government of the republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC)(South Africa) 
para 94 
19
 Wiles E “Aspirational Principle or Enforceable Rights? The future for socio-economic rights in 
National Law” (2006) 22 American University Law Review 35-64 
20
 Mclean K “Objections to socio-economic rights “ Challenges posed by socio-economic rights for 
judicial review” 2009 PULP 109  
21
 Section 7(2) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (The Constitution) 
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There is an on-going debate between scholars, legal experts, academics and litigants 
as to what extent the state should be held accountable for the enforcement of these 
rights.  Mia Swart observes that if the government fails to adhere to court orders in 
relation to socio-economic rights, it should be held in contempt for not executing 
orders22.   However, a rule nissi will have to be issued first, to allow the target of the 
order to show cause as to why he or she should not be held in contempt23.  This is a 
clear time-consuming process and one which some litigants find themselves out of 
resources, to continue forward.  
How then does one measure state performance to socio-economic rights? It is the 
role of the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to monitor, assess and 
investigate, and report on the performance of human rights, according to the 
Constitution24.  In turn, these reports are submitted to Parliament for assessment 
and recommendation. The SAHRC is expected to monitor state compliance with 
judgements and the CCSA has taken cognisance of this role25.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Swart M “Left out in the cold?  Crafting Constitutional Remedies for the poorest of the poor” (2005) 
21 SAJHR 240  
23
 Currie I and De Waal J “The Bill of Rights handbook” 5 ed (2005) 225 
24
 Section 184(3) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
25
 South African Human Rights Commission available at http:// www.sahrc.org.za (access 7 September 
2012) 
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1.4 The three categories of Constitutional socio-economic rights 
Liebenberg describes the first set of rights as qualified socio-economic rights26.  They 
are; access to adequate housing, health care services, sufficient food and water, and 
social security27.  The reason, she emphasises for describing it as “qualified”, relates 
to subsection (2) of section 26 and 27 of the rights. The description of the rights are 
limited to a qualification she explains; that the state explicitly take reasonable 
legislative, and other measures within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights. The second category consists of the 
socio-economic rights of children, detained people, and basic education. The final 
category deals with the right not to be evicted from one’s home, or have one’s home 
demolished without an order of court, and a further right; that no one may be 
refused emergency medical treatment. 
These categories of rights, stipulated in section 26 and section 27, place a negative 
and positive duty on the state. Positive rights usually request an action, whereas 
negative rights usually require inaction28.  Liebenberg emphasises that International 
Human rights law recognises that the effective guarantee of human rights depends 
on the combination of positive and negative duties29. 
An illustration of positive duties, which were imposed on the state, was found in 
Minister of Health & Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others (TAC)30, where 
the court request the state to take reasonable steps to realise the rights violated. 
The court referred to section 26(2).  However, the court explicitly held that section 
26(1) must be read together with section 26(2), in order to understand the real 
                                                          
26
 Woolman S, Bishop M and Brickhall J “Constitutional law of South Africa” 2 ed (2008) 2 et al ch 33 
Liebenberg S “The Interpretation of Socio-economic Rights” paras 33-5 
27
 Section 26(1) and 27(1) The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa  
28
 The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists both positive and negative rights 
(but does not identify them as such) 
29
 Liebenberg S Socio, Economic rights: Adjudication under a transformative Constitution (2010) 83   
Also see Fredman S Human Rights transformed: Positive Rights and positive duties (2008)  
30
 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) 
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duties the section places on the state. The court held that the two sections cannot 
be read in isolation.   
The third categories of rights are contained section 26(3) and section 27(3).  These 
rights were discussed in the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu – 
Natal31, the court made it clear that the scope of section 27(3) is restricted to 
existing services, not new services which still need to be established. In this case, the 
applicant requested on-going dialysis treatment and the court denied his claim. The 
court held that the right in section 27(3) had been formed in a negative term, and its 
scope was thus restricted to receive immediate remedial medical treatment that is 
“necessary” and “available” and to avert harm in a case of sudden emergency32. 
It is clear that the formulation of these sections presented its own unique set of 
interpretations, as illustrated in the Soobramoney case.  This case was the first socio-
economic rights case and as much as the case had negative consequences for the 
applicant, it remained the case which allowed the court to interpret socio-economic 
right, while taking into account resource constraints.  This case will be further 
discussed in chapter 3 of this paper.  In essence, the court in the Soobramoney case 
accepted that the enforcement of these rights raised much difficulty but it is 
submitted that the duty belonged to the CCSA to give contents to these rights.  The 
Constitution created the CCSA and the initial idea was that the court’s institutional 
competencies, to adjudicate socio-economic rights cases, were adequate to fulfil its 
mandate.  It is understandable that the CCSA will be faced with some challenges.  
One of the main challenges being the doctrine of separation of powers, but it is 
argued that the way the CCSA defines this challenge will eventually strengthen or 
weaken the CCSA’s existence.   The jurisprudence of the CCSA has shown that it is 
                                                          
31
 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC)  
32
 See judgement of Chaskalson P paras 28-36 in the Soobramoney case 
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this very doctrine, and its margin of appreciation, that has resulted in the CCSA 
failing to provide remedies which can be executed efficiently33.   
 
 1.5 The court’s approach to the doctrine of separation of powers 
This doctrine was traditionally viewed as a functional division of power between the 
three branches of government34.  Commentators have argued that there is a clear 
boundary between these branches which should result in each one understanding its 
powers and functions.  Mclean, in her analysis of various writers on this topic, has 
come to the conclusion that the doctrine of separation of powers is important for 
the judicial review of socio-economic rights issues, and that these reviews strain the 
conventional role of the courts35.   She further argues that a pure theory of the 
doctrine of separation of powers is not possible, as this would imply a complete 
separation of powers between the three branches, a situation that is almost 
impossible.  She explains this theory by referring to the so-called “partial” doctrine of 
separation of powers that was developed over the years. This theory, she continues, 
recognised the overlap of powers in government. The idea is to allow for checks and 
balances to operate, and this in turn, will ensure that public power is being exercised 
consistently with the Constitution. It is this overlap that is causing the tension 
between the branches.  The shift in interpreting the doctrine of separation of powers 
as “partial”, in exercising judicial review, is vital as an accountability mechanism, for 
the other two branches. This can only enhance a transformative Constitution, 
resulting in a sustainable democracy36.  This theory of Mclean may also be 
understood as creating a participatory democracy.   
 
                                                          
33
 Rautenbach I M “Policy and judicial review –political questions, margin of appreciation and the 
South African constitution” (2012) 1 20-34 
34
 Mclean K (2009)105  
35
 Mclean K (2009) 107 
36
Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” 1998 SAJHR 146. 
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In the TAC case, the Constitutional Court emphasised that: 
“This Court has made it clear, on more than one occasion that 
although there are no bright lines that separate the roles of the 
legislature, the executive and the courts from one another, there are 
certain matters that are pre-eminently within the domain of one or 
other of the arms of government and not the others. All arms of 
government should be sensitive to and respect this separation”.  
Chaskalson P, observed in Ferreira v Levin NO and others37, that at times, these 
functions may overlap, but warns that terrains are in the main, separate; and should 
be kept separate.  Bilchitz agree with the views of Chaskalson and further submitted 
that there is a need for a critical understanding amongst these organs that they are 
organs of one body and that they need to work in tandem, and within a spirit of 
complementarities, to achieve the common good of society as a whole38.  Even 
though the debate surrounding the doctrine of separation of powers continues, 
there is no doubt that the courts have shown deference to the state in its first ten 
years of the existence of the CCSA.  It is argued, that as much as Chaskalson admitted 
there would be overlapping, he is not willing to extend under which circumstances 
these overlapping will be considered acceptable. In essence, it is understandable 
that no judicial officer would want to define a line of acceptability in this type of 
matter, and as he points out that these terrains should be kept separate. It is this 
evasiveness; it has been submitted that has caused the courts to fail to provide a 
positive jurisprudence for effective socio-economic rights remedies.   
 
 
                                                          
37
 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) 
38
 Kapindu  R “Pulling back the frontiers of Constitutional Deference: Mazibuko & Others v City of 
Johannesburg & others and its implications” 2009 Conference paper available at 
http://isthisseattaken.co.za/pdf/papers Kapindu.pdf  (access on 8 September 2012) 
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1.6  Conclusion  
This chapter has demonstrated the importance, international human rights 
instruments had on the formulation of socio-economic provisions in the South 
African Constitution.   It has further provided insight into the State’s lack of realising 
the rights progressively, mainly due to the court’s inability to set benchmarks and 
providing a normative interpretation of socio-economic rights.  The chapter has 
acknowledged that socio-economic rights is justiciable but due to the doctrine of 
separation of powers, it does not receive the full extent of the CCSA’s remedial 
powers, and due to the court’s overreaching deference it has shown to the state.  
Chapter 2 will analyse the CCSA powers on judicial review, as one remedial source 
for the enforcement of socio-economic rights. It will further focus on various case 
law studies on how judicial discretion and the judges’ manner of interpretation has 
shaped the outcome of these cases. 
Chapter 3 will assess the CCSA jurisprudence and various tests that have been 
developed by the court, in understanding the court’s interpretation of the rights and 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. This chapter will provide a clear 
understanding on how the court has failed to provide normative interpretation of 
the right and the overreaching deference the court has shown the state. The study 
will explore the debates in favour of, and against, the minimum core approach, and 
from this discussion it will become clear that this study does not support the 
minimum core approach.  The introduction of meaningful engagement in this 
chapter is considered a step in the right direction. The chapter will end with an in-
depth discussion on the courts development of this approach focusing on a 
sustainable long-term solution.   
 Chapter 4 will demonstrate a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of a structural 
interdicts.  It will demonstrate the defects of the interdict, as well as solutions.  
Lastly it will provide certain elements that a court may identify in cases, when 
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considering this remedy.  Chapter five will set out the recommendation of this paper, 
which will encourage courts to use, as regularly as possible, supervisory orders and 
structural interdicts as one method to ensure an effective remedy to socio-
economics rights infringement.   Taken into account that those who seek fulfilment 
of these rights are people who have been marginalised due to apartheid and where 
the resources of the country have been unequally distributed for centuries.  This 
chapter will emphasise the conclusion that will be reached in chapter 3 regarding 
minimum core, as a short solution which will create more frustration amongst the 
most vulnerable of people.  Consequently this imposes a duty on someone to choose 
between two poor marginalised groups of people to received assistance first.   This 
paper will argue for a remedy that will be sustainable for generations to come. In 
this regard then it is submitted, that courts grant supervisory orders with structural 
interdicts and to allow for meaningful engagement, with its citizens who has first-
hand knowledge of the issues at hand.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE EFFECTIVE USE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY AS A REMEDIAL TOOL 
2.1  Introduction   
The CCSA does not receive many socio-economic rights cases to adjudicate. When it 
does, it should make full use of its capacity to lay down a clear interpretation of the 
rights.  It is expected of the court to make use of the protective remedies available in 
the Constitution and to give meaning to it by way of effective interpretation. Justice 
Ackermann emphasises in a judgment that:  
“……Particularly in a country where so few have the means to enforce their 
rights through the courts, it is essential that on those occasions when the 
legal process does establish that an infringement of an entrenched right has 
occurred, it be effectively vindicated. The courts have a particular 
responsibility in this regard and are obliged to ‘forge new tools’ and shape 
innovative remedies, if needs be, to achieve this goal39. 
The judicial review powers are a mechanism available to the CCSA to measure the 
legislatures and executives laws and policies to the effect that it conforms to a 
Constitutional standard.   The Constitution has a value-based interpretation and 
judicial review has been explicitly incorporated in the Constitution to protect those 
values.  Karl Klare correctly pointed out, that the Constitution invites a new 
imagination and self-reflection about legal methods, analysis and reasoning 
consistent with its transformative goal40. The Constitution, he states, is not self-
executing but an evolving text that must be interpreted and applied.  It is submitted 
that this is not an easy task and the CCSA must perform these interpretations 
keeping in mind a regions social context.   
                                                          
39
 The Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign  2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.Afr) paras 101-102 
40
 Klare K (1998)156 
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 In countries such as the United States of America and Canada, judicial review was 
founded on a simple idea; namely the duty of the court was to apply the law and 
where two laws were in conflict, the more fundamental constitutional law was 
selected as the governing rule. In the United States of America, judicial review has 
not explicitly been established but has been inferred from the structure, provisions 
and history of the Constitution41.   
 
The CCSA should be more creative when applying judicial review. It is argued that 
the CCSA should promote a strong form of review, and encourage consistency 
amongst the judges.  This chapter, promotes a strong form of judicial review in socio-
economic rights cases, as some of the remedies available under a strong form of 
review, provides immediate relief and this will ensure that the most vulnerable of 
society receive immediate assistance, with a long term effect.  This chapter will 
assess the various forms of judicial review and it will further illustrate how the 
judges’ interpretation affects which form of review to apply.  
 
2.2 The scope of judicial review 
 
Judicial review of legislation is defined as the duty of the CCSA to declare any law or 
conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution invalid, to the extent of its 
discrepancies.  The two forms of reviews that the Constitution provides have been 
incorporated by design not by mistake. It should not create confusion but should be 
applied for its purpose.  It might come across from certain cases that a judicial 
discretion is being used when judicial review is applied.  The cases that will be 
discussed later in this chapter, will provide a clearer understanding of how judges 
                                                          
41
  The Supreme Court decision in the landmark case of Marbury v Madison (1803), Judge Marshall 
defended judicial review and believed that the function of the courts are to decide cases according to 
law, and that the courts are ruling on the constitutionality of legislation not because it has a general 
commission to oversee Congress legislation behaviour but because the Constitution was higher law, 
available at  http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Osborne_reynolds.aspx (access on 8 September 
2012)   
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have used strong or weak form of review. It is however clear that judicial review is an 
effective remedy when used while taking into consideration the countries’ past 
history.  Section 172, has been interpreted as promoting a strong form of review and 
section 39(2) promotes weak form of review. The interpretation of these sections 
must be done in the prism of the Bill of Rights as specified in the preamble42. 
 
2.2.1 Strong form of judicial review (section 172) 
Section 172(1)(a) refers to constitutional review that is rigorous and robust (strong) 
by any standard43.  Once the court declares the legislation unconstitutional, it has 
two options on how it wants to deal with the legislation. 
 Firstly, it may use its power in severance, reading-in, or cutting words. These are 
constitutional remedies that correspond with section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution 
which allow for "any order that is just and equitable" as an outcome of constitutional  
adjudication, undoubtedly a strong form of judicial review.  Secondly, it may refer 
the legislation back to parliament for redrafting, over a specific period of time. The 
court is flexible and may grant various types of orders, which includes; declaratory 
orders; mandatory orders; damages; structural interdicts; reading in words and 
contempt of court orders. In the case of Fose v Minister of Safety and Security44, the 
court held that:  
“*t+he courts have a particular responsibility . . . and are obliged to ‘forge new 
tools’ and shape innovative remedies, if needs be . . . .”  The Court stressed 
that “an appropriate remedy must mean an effective remedy”45. 
                                                          
42
 Du Plessis L “Interpretation” in Woolman (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa Volume 2 (2 ed) 
2006 32-136 to 32-158 
43
 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) 
44
 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) (S. Afr.) 
45
 Fose par 888-89 
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To illustrate the use of strong review, reference is made to the case of Daniels v 
Campbell NO & Others46.   The court was dealing with the interpretation of two 
Legislations; the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act of 1990 and the Marriage Act 
of 1961. The court had to interpret the word “spouse”.  The court understood the 
word “spouse”, in the first legislation, to include partners in Muslim marriages, 
which was not the same in the second piece of legislation.   The majority judgment in 
this case thought that such an extensive reading was necessary to guarantee the 
constitutionality of a provision that would otherwise have been struck down or 
declared unconstitutional; this is also referred to as reading up. The idea is where 
one of two conflicting interpretations of a statutory provision better promotes the 
spirit, purpose and object of the Bill of Rights than the other one, the former is to be 
preferred.   
Lourens Du Plessis, warned against a misunderstanding that this “reading in” and 
“reading up” and emphasises, it is not the same as the use in section 39(2) as this 
section requires that existing law must be “developed” in light of the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights47. 
 
  2.2.2 Weak form of review (section 39(2)) 
Section 39(2) does not declare legislation unconstitutional. The court merely 
reinterpreted the existing legislation and tried to bring it into conformity with the 
Constitutional requirements. Section 39(2) is crucial in the application of the 
Constitution. It also deals more with the principle of subsidiary, and promotes the 
indirect application of the Bill of Rights. Both sections 39(2) and section 8(3) promote 
the development of existing laws and they are encouraged to be read together.  
                                                          
46
 2004 (5) SA 331 (CC) 
47
 Du Plessis L (2006) 32-136 and 32-158  
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Woolman48 warns against the lack of understanding the application of this section.  
He states that before one considers the indirect application of the Bill of Rights and 
the development of new rules of law, one must first ascertain what the ambit is of 
the alleged applicable constitutional provisions. Only when one determines the 
ambit and finds that it does not speak to the issue raised by an ordinary rule of law, 
one can turn to the more open-ended invitation of section 39(2).  
Currie49 believes that the power of interpretation should be left for politics.  The 
idea, he says, is to leave room for the legislature to reform the law in accordance 
with its own interpretation of the Constitution.  He states that it would be much 
better for the legislature to decide on an issue, before a court decides on it. This 
paper rejects this argument.  However the Minister of Justice, Mr Jeff Radebe, would 
welcome such an approach from the courts, for the legislature to decide on the 
issue. This idea of the minister is further supported by Du Plessis and Ngcobo CJ, 
where they propose an approach whereby the principle of subsidiary should be 
applied. This operates as follows; when a piece of legislation comes under 
constitutional scrutiny, the legislation should first be considered under section 39(2) 
and only if no meaningful alternative interpretation can be found,  then as a second 
leg should section 172 be applied.   However, the Constitution does not promote a 
single approach as the correct one, and it is merely a different manner of 
interpretation that has been illustrated by the judges.  
In contrast, Mark Tushnet promotes weak form of review very prominently50. He 
finds that weak form of review suggests solutions to practical and theoretical 
problems51. He states that it is crucial to attempt to create joint responsibility and 
genuine dialogue between the courts and the legislator, with respect to fundamental 
rights.  He finds that the weak form of review creates a model promise to ensure 
                                                          
48
 Woolman  S “The amazing vanishing Bill of Rights” (2007) 124 SALJ  784 
49
 Currie I “Judicious avoidance” (1999) 15 SAJHR 142 
50
 Tushnet M “The rise of weak-form constitutional review” in Ginsburg T and Dixon R (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011)333 
51
 Tushnet (2011) 321-331 
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important matters of principle back into legislative and popular debate. Tushnet 
believes that weak form of review would provide a fundamentally direct resolution 
of the democratic difficulties associated with traditional judicial review.  He 
acknowledges that weak form of review could degenerate into the return of 
preliminary supremacy, but he concedes that it will reduce the tension between the 
branches of government.  This view of Tushnet, it is submitted, is too high a risk in a 
new democracy as he rightfully pointed out it could promote parliamentary 
sovereignty; it would most certainly work in a much older, well-established 
democracy52. 
There is already rife tension, since 2011, in debates in South Africa on this issue.  The 
issue of interfering with the doctrine of separation of powers was in high debate, 
turning the relationship between the judiciary and government into furious hostility 
with terrifying implications53.   The tension became worse when the president of 
South Africa, President Jacob Zuma, announced in 2011 that he wished to “review 
the powers54 of the Constitutional Court”55.  
The South African legislature prefers weak form of review as this allow for a dialogue 
where the court informs the legislature of the court’s understanding of the 
constitutional provision, whilst allowing the legislature to respond, and take 
conclusive action, based on its own understanding.  However, the CCSA has reached 
no conformity between its judges on judicial review, and interpretations are based 
                                                          
52
 See Dixon R “Creating dialogue about socio economic rights: strong v weak from judicial review 
revisited“(2006) Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper. Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights Series number 3 
53
 In Legal brief report issue number 3019, on 20 April 2012 it was reported that “Though there are 
differing views about exactly when the relationship between government and the judiciary began to 
unravel, most agree that by the time Judge Mogoeng Mogoeng was nominated for Chief Justice and 
then appointed by President Jacob Zuma, things were already seriously askew” 
54
 Section 165(4) allows for constitutional amendments “The assessment is aimed at enhancing the 
measures the legislative measures and programmes designed and developed by government to 
realize the objectives of this section  
55
 The government wishes to do an assessment on the transformation of the judicial system and the 
role of the judiciary in a developmental state, the assessment must be completed in 18 months.  See 
the Soobramoney v Minister of Health document on the transformation of the judicial system and the 
role of the judiciary in the developmental South African state  February 2012  
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on the judge’s discretion. It is this very discretion of the majority and minority 
judgments that has created the hostility between the judiciary and parliament.    
2.2.3 Judge’s discretion in applying judicial review 
In demonstrating the use of the discretion, reference is made to three cases briefly. 
The first case is, Government of the republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others56, 
whereby the Court applied a weak form of review. The case deals with the right to 
access of housing, section 26 of the Constitution.  The court refused to involve itself 
with government policies and held that their only duty is to make sure that those 
government policies are reasonable. The court did however, hold further, that the 
housing system in place did not meet the standard of reasonableness as it 
unreasonably failed to consider and address those in most terrible need of housing57. 
The Court issued a declaratory order only.   In the case of The Minister of health v 
Treatment Action Campaign58, the court applied strong form of review. The case 
deals with the supply of Nevirapine drugs to HIV positive mothers, thereby 
preventing mother to child transmission of HIV to a limited number of ‘pilot sites’. 
The Court ruled that the government programme, in this case, failed the 
reasonableness test and ordered the government to remove, without delay, the 
restrictions that prevented Nevirapine from being made available outside the pilot 
sites, and for it to be distributed where medically indicated.  Even though the court 
in the TAC case only provided a mandatory order it also made it clear what is 
expected of government.  The difference between the mandatory and declaratory 
order lies in their enforceability. Once a declaratory order is ignored there is no real 
recourse, unlike a mandatory order which is an interdict, and is enforceable by way 
of contempt proceedings59. 
                                                          
56
 2001 (1)SA 46 (CC)(S.Afr) 
57
 Grootboom paras 35 -38 
58
 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.Afr) 
59
 TAC paras 96-97 
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The above cases are, but a few examples, of how a judgment can differ depending 
on the Court’s interpretation on which rights, values, text and context the court gives 
preference to and how the limitations on certain rights are interpreted is in the 
discretion of the judges60. 
The judiciary’s inconsistency is further demonstrated by Roux in the case of Minister 
of Home Affairs v Fourie61, which relates to the common law definition of marriage, 
to illustrate how judges can reach the same conclusion based on two different 
opinions on an outcome.  Justice Sachs opted for a weak form of review, as he 
believed it was important to enlist the help of the legislature in the enforcement of a 
legal change that was likely to be highly disruptive and ran the risk of future 
weakening public support for the Court.  However, for Justice O’Regan, the 
constitutional text was sufficiently clear and a strong form of review was suggested 
and relief should be granted immediately by the court, as justice delayed, is justice 
denied62, she emphasises.  
O’Regan noted that should the CCSA, in its first decade of existence, have provided a 
stronger, theoretically more secure foundation for its Bill of Rights jurisprudence 
than the current CCSA’s jurisprudence would have been on a more solid footing 
now63.  Woolman criticises the judges for relying too much on weak form of review 
in section 39(2) and for overusing it in challenging cases64. 
It is submitted that the remedy of judicial review could be considered effective when 
dealing with legislation and policies.  Tushnet’s reasoning, for promoting weak form 
                                                          
60
 See Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa CCT 48/10 dated 17 March 2011.    
61
 2006 (1) SALR 524 (CC) 
62
 Roux T (2009) 9 
63
 O’Regan K November 2011 “The role of the Constitutional Court in our Democracy” at a Helen 
Suzman Memorial Lecture, Johannesburg, states “…in a Constitutional democracy  the relationship 
between these arms of government is structured in a way to ensure that the power of each is checked 
or restrained by the other” Justice Yacoob, 2012, in a paper presented at a constitutional week at the 
University of Cape Town, stated “ The constitution in my view has its own check and balances in 
relation to the power of the judiciary and its possible political impact”  
64
 Woolman S (2007) 786 
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of review is practical and well-founded, but not in a country such as South Africa 
where there is no strong opposition party.  Using strong form of review by the 
courts, will obliged government to re-evaluate its Constitutional obligation in socio-
economics rights cases, in future litigation.   
 
2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter assessed the effectiveness of strong and weak form of review by 
discussing the judicial discretion the court applied in various cases. There was 
presented in this chapter views for, and against, both judicial reviews were 
illustrated and this chapter concluded with the paper promoting strong form of 
review.   
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PART 11 
CHAPTER 3 
THE COURT REMEDIES, REJECTION OF MINIMUM CORE AND MEANINGFUL 
ENGAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION 
3.1  Introduction 
Liebenberg believes, and this paper supports this view, that courts should start using 
their remedial powers in socio-economic rights cases more effectively65.  The court 
can instruct the state to develop programmes which can bring about the changes 
needed. Her advice to the court is to overcome its reluctance to grant supervisory 
remedies, in order to facilitate the long-term structural reforms required to realise 
socio-economic rights.  These types of orders, will allow the court to monitor 
compliance with its orders, and it will enhance participation with all parties 
concerned.  This will further, allow the courts, the opportunity to give forms of 
tangible relief to those experiencing immediate deprivations, to avoid irreparable 
threats to life, health and future development. The nature and extent of this relief 
will depend on the context of the right, keeping close attention to the democratic 
values which calls for the basic necessities of life to be provided to all; if it is to be a 
society based on human dignity, freedom and equality66.  
The jurisprudence of the court, as will be discussed in this chapter, will illustrate that 
the remedies provided, have brought the citizens no closer in realising their socio-
economic rights. This can also be attributed to the method of interpretation of the 
rights in question before the court. By critically analysing the court’s interpretation 
of these rights which resulted in declaratory and mandatory orders being issued, 
together with academic views of certain scholars, it will become clear that there is 
                                                          
65
 Liebenberg S “Needs, Rights and Transformation: Adjudicating Social Rights” Centre for Human 
rights and Global justice working paper, Economic and Social rights Series (2005) 30 
66
 Liebenberg S (2005) 30 
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no straightforward understanding to these rights. The lack of substantive reasoning 
of these rights remains a challenge.  
This chapter will focus further, in more detail, on the court’s reluctance to apply a 
minimum core to socio-economic rights and its criticisms will follow. The main 
critical question that this chapter wants to address is whether the minimum core can 
provide a remedy to ensure full enjoyment of socio-economic rights which is 
sustainable for generations to come. The answer is simply no, however not for the 
reasons provided by the court.  The discussion will consist of the court’s reasoning 
and various academics that promote and reject the minimum core approach.   
This chapter will further discuss the relevance of the application of meaningful 
engagement as a positive direction allowing participation between the parties, with 
a view to encouraging contributions to policy development.  The idea, as Brian Ray 
explains and fully discusses later in this chapter, is that meaningful engagement 
should be incorporated into policies from its inception. He refers to it as political 
engagement67.  It is argued that Ray understands the importance and practicality 
implication of engagement.  
 
3.2.  The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the reasonable review 
approach and the notion of progressive realisation within available 
resources 
The concept of the “reasonable review approach”, in the jurisprudence of socio-
economic rights cases in South Africa, imposes a duty on the state.  However it is 
submitted that the CCSA has failed to adopt a consistent methodology in applying 
this reasonable review approach as a result the state use this confusion to delay its 
socio-economics rights obligations.   
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 Ray B “Proceduralisation’s Triumph and Engagement’s Promise in Socio-Economic Rights Litigation 
SAJHR”, Symposium Issue on Public Interest Litigation in South Africa  2011 
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In highlighting the manner of the courts approach, four major South African socio-
economic rights cases will be discussed and analysed namely; Soobramoney68,  
Grootboom69, Treatment Action Campaign70 and  Mazibuko71. Throughout these 
cases, it can be observed that socio-economic rights have not yet established a 
rightful place in society due to the lack of the court inconsistencies in defining the 
normative value of the rights.   No framework of socio-economic right has been 
developed by the CCSA to introduce benchmarks for the state’s policies.   
The critical question is therefore: how progressive are socio-economic rights in 
reality to the court?, and why has the Court continuously failed to protect these 
rights?.  Biltchitz provides a possible answer; he states that the judiciary’s deference 
to the government in socio-economic rights cases seems to have been pushed too 
far out by the socio-economic rights cases and there is a need to pull them back72.   
This paper is in agreement with this observation but clearly this is not enough.  
Mitra Abedolahi also, criticises the Constitution for failing to provide a clear meaning 
of socio-economic rights.  She asked; how can the judiciary evaluate whether or not 
the State is fulfilling its duties to “respect, protect, promote and fulfil” these rights, 
with so much uncertainty? How can vague rights be meaningfully adjudicated or 
enforced and violations remedied73? Klare explains and correctly points out that the 
constitution invites a new imagination and self-reflection about legal methods, 
analysis and reasoning consistent with its transformative goal74.     All these writers 
seems to agree that the judiciary must become more actively involved with 
interpreting socio-economic rights openly, clearly, and effectively with special 
                                                          
68
 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu – Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 
69
 Government of the republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others 2001 (1)SA 46 (CC)(S.Afr.)   
70
 Minster of Health &Others v Treatment Action Campaign & Others 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (S.Afri.) 
71
 Lindiwe Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg & Others 2010(3) BCLR 239 (CC) 
72
 Bilchitz D “Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the foundation for future 
socio-economic rights jurisprudence” (2003) 19 SAJHR 4  
73
 Ebadolahi M “Using structural interdicts and the South African Human Rights Commission to 
achieve judicial enforcement of economic and social rights in South Africa” 2008 NYU School of Law 
1567 
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Klare K “Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism” 1998 SAJHR 156 
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attention to the needs of the recipients of these rights.   How the courts have 
interpreted socio-economic rights will receive further scrutiny in the next 
paragraphs.  
 
 
3.2.1 The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of these rights 
 
3.2.2.1 The rational test in Soobramoney v Minister of Health,   
            Kwazulu–Natal  
The first case that considered the scope of socio-economic rights was the case of S v 
Soobramoney.  Mr Soobramoney suffered from a terminal illness, which required 
him to receive dialysis treatment. The hospital policy only allowed treatment for 
people who are eligible for a kidney transplant.  He relied on section 27(3) of the 
Constitution, which states that “no one may be refused emergency medical 
treatment.”  The court, in this matter, adopted the rational test and held that the 
word “emergency” in this section does not refer to people in situations such as the 
applicant75.  The court further held that should terminally ill people receive 
treatment, such as what the applicant needed first, it would result in depleting the 
available resource for preventative health care and other illnesses which are not life-
threatening.   
Furthermore, the court stated that Mr Soobramoney’s case would have failed even 
in respect of section 27(1) as the court found that the eligibility criteria adopted by 
the hospital were reasonable given the resource constraints. The court held further 
that section 27 must be read in the context of the state’s limited resources expressly 
contained in section 27(2), which provides that; “The state must take reasonable 
legislative and other measures within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of theses”.   
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In this regard, the provincial government offered evidence that it had to balance a 
great number of health priorities with a woefully inadequate budget76.  The court 
concluded on this basis, that “a court will be slow to interfere with rational decisions 
taken in good faith by political organs and medical authorities whose responsibilities 
it is to deal with such matters”77.  Lehman state that most scholars accepted that Mr 
Soobramoney’s interest in prolonging his life had to be sacrificed in the interest of 
the general welfare of others78.   
The court made it clear in the manner its judgment is articulated, that it shall not 
over-step its separation of powers and that each branch has a duty that the other 
should not interfere with.  The court has drawn a distinction between extending one 
life on the one hand, and treating a number of ill people on the other, in respect of 
budgetary issues.  It is submitted there that this type of concession expressed in the 
Soobramoney case can never be justified in a democratic state.  It is argued that the 
court should have requested the state to present other options of where resources 
could be obtained from, for example, the court never explored the possibility of 
requesting the state to obtain funds from other departments or even borrow money 
from other countries to assist. These types of socio-economic rights should be 
considered primary where it comes to budget allocation.  It is further argued that the 
concept “within available resources” should change to “within all available 
resources” as this will include all the departments’ resources79. 
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 Soobramoney  para 33 
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 Soobramoney  para 29 
78
 Lehmann K “In Defense of Constitutional Court: Litigating Socio-economic rights and the Myth of the 
minimum Core”  American University International Law review 1, (2006) 22  
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  See further General comment 3 para 13 “ The Committee notes that the phrase "to the maximum 
of its available resources" was intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources 
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3.2.2.2 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom &   
                      Others: declaring the duties of the state    
This case has been the source of many debates and analysis in academic writings. 
Grootboom, established the states duty towards socio-economic rights, even though 
the court recognised that housing was "a constitutional issue of fundamental 
importance to the development of South Africa's new Constitutional order", failed to 
define the extent of the states’ duty. 
The rubber stamping of the agreement resulted in many of the people’s rights not 
being fully identified and analysed.  The state in this matter, agreed to provide 
urgent relief to the applicants before court only.  Liebenberg does not agree with the 
state’s offer to only assist the applicants as there were other people in the same 
situations who also needed the court’s intervention.  She argues that it is 
inappropriate to distinguish between different disadvantaged groups in the absence 
of compelling justification such as a severe shortage of resources80.    
The judge in the Grootboom case continued to develop a “standard of 
reasonableness” as a guide in deciding whether government’s policies conformed to 
the Constitutional requirements. The end result of the interpretation of this case 
resulted in signifying that the court had shown deference for the legislature and 
executive, in their policy development.  The Court acknowledged that "a wide range 
of possible measures could be adopted by the State to meet the requirement of 
reasonableness."  It can be argued that this approach is too flexible and open-ended, 
and what should have been established is a context in which reasonableness should 
be measured and proper benchmarks should have been developed to assist the 
state.   The courts jurisprudence would have been firmly established and advanced if 
only the court adhered to these types of suggestions.  
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In effect, the declaratory order that was granted was a general order with a mere 
function of interpreting the policies of government with the one aim to establish if 
the policies were reasonable; not the result that was initially aimed at when the 
application was brought to court.   
Seen in this light, the contention made by Sunstain is not unusual when he said that 
the Grootboom case is a typical administrative law case81.  It can be argued that the 
manner in which the model of reasonableness review has been developed, by the 
CCSA, does not represent the best approach to the judicial enforcement of these 
rights.  
3.2.2.3 The assessment of reasonable review and progressive realisation via a 
declaratory order and its effect   
The assessment of the reasonableness of the state’s programmes and policies are 
influenced by two further factors; the internal limitations of section 26(2) which 
requires that the rights be “progressively realised”, and that the availability of 
resources is an important factor in determining what is reasonable82.    
Biltchitz disagrees with the Court’s interpretation of the reasonable standard 
approach, and emphasises that an enquiry into the reasonableness of the measures, 
adopted by the state, must also involve an enquiry into the content of the rights 
contained in sections 26(1) and 27(1)83.  Liebenberg supports this analysis and states 
that there was a need for the government to place evidence before the Court 
concerning the alleged floodgate implications of granting direct relief84.  
Mclean captured the essence of the Court’s approach correctly, when she stated 
that the Court’s analysis of these sections are a limited interpretation of section 26, 
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which resulted in ignoring the more practical and progressive understanding of the 
state’s duty in national legislation and international law.85  She believes that the 
court has adopted a highly deferential approach in interpreting the scope and 
meaning of section 26.  This is further illustrated by Yacoob’s failure to consider the 
jurisprudence of the ESCR committee, that requested the state “to take steps” which 
should be deliberate, concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards fulfilling 
that right86. 
Liebenberg has suggested a more substantive judicial approach to the 
reasonableness review.  She states that it should build on, or at least incorporate, a 
further principled and systematic interpretation of the content of the various socio-
economic rights.  She suggests that consideration should be given to the value of the 
rights and the impact of the denial of the rights, on each group87.  This approach 
coincides with Ebedolahi’s request for more clarity on these fundamental rights.  
 
The court in the Grootboom case issued a declaratory order requiring the state to 
implement progressively, within its available resources, a comprehensive 
programme to realise the right of access to adequate housing.  The programme 
should contain, the court held, provisions which undertake to provide shelter for 
those in desperate need of housing either due to intolerable living conditions or 
crisis situations.  The order further required that the programme must be balanced 
and flexible and appropriate, providing for short, medium, and long-term needs.  
Additionally, it must also allocate responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres 
of government, to ensure that financial and human resources are available.  The 
programme must be reasonably formulated and implemented88.  It is submitted that 
the order in the Grootboom case was vague and did not provide details to the state. 
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What is expected of the state now, is to fill the gaps, which in fact is the duty of the 
court.  Pillay argues, that the declaratory nature of the order meant that it did not 
compel the state to take steps to ensure that its programme complied with the 
Constitutional requirements89.  Furthermore, the CCSA’s order did not contain any 
time frames, within which the state had to act, and unfortunately the Court also 
refrained from exercising a supervisory role, which it could have easily ordered90.  It 
cannot be denied that the Grootboom case did set out the duties of the state very 
prominently. These duties merely needed structure and formulation, which will be 
further discussed in chapter 4 of this paper.    
The main difference between this case and the case of Soobramoney, is that the 
government policy in Grootboom focuses on medium to long-term needs and 
providing emergency relief for the most vulnerable in need of urgent housing. In 
Soobramoney, the court weighed up the interest of survival between two groups 
first, before justifying its decision.  This interpretation of Grootboom, is a step that is 
in line with the spirit of a democratic state.  However, the court in the Grootboom 
case, made it clear that socio-economic rights do not give rise to a direct individual 
entitlement to the provision of socio-economic resources and service.    
Various academic writers expressed different view on the outcome of the 
Grootboom case. Wesson agrees with the basic structure of the case and believes 
that the Grootboom judgment could develop into a framework for the adjudication 
of socio-economic rights that is not only coherent but which also strikes an 
appropriate balance between the competing roles of the state and the judiciary91. 
Liebenberg characterised the Grootboom case as a positive precedent for the judicial 
enforcement of economic and social rights92.   Roux again states that the flaw in the 
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decision is not found in the Court's substantive reasoning, but rather in the form of 
the order made93.  He argues that the Court failed to back up its declaration of 
constitutional invalidity with a proper enforcement mechanism. He criticises the 
Court for failing to do justice to the remedies available, under the South African 
Constitution94. 
On the positive side to the Grootboom case, Jung and Paremoer argue that the 
courts started to function not only as mechanisms of accountability, but also as a 
location where embattled communities could take the government to task for the 
poor quality of public debate, and their unconcern for the adverse effects of public 
policies95.  
Lehmann in contrast to Liebenberg believes, that the decision to prioritise certain 
interests is very rational and reasonable, and that an executive cannot be faulted for 
doing so; provided its choices are rational and reasonable96.  Lehmann further argues 
that policies should never be set aside due to a ranking of interest. Moreover, she 
cautions the judiciary's use of power and argues that their function is to scrutinise 
the rationality and reasonableness of government policies. This concept is the same 
as in the Grootboom case.  
Lehman further attempts to justify the above-mentioned restriction on the judiciary, 
by emphasising that it is an impossible task for the Court to evaluate the 
reasonableness of budgetary allocation, without extensive evidence97.  It would 
appear that Lehman supports the view of the Grootboom judgment.    
From the above discussion it is clear that the declaratory order presented a mix view 
but all the writers are in agreement that more clarity in the order is needed.  It is 
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argued that reasonableness review is but one step in the courts questioning to 
state’s policies but more is needed to ensure fulfilment of socio-economic rights. 
 
3.2.2.4  Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign: A positive step to resource 
allocation where a mandatory order is granted  
The court in the Minister of Health v Treatment Action Campaign (TAC case) granted 
a mandatory order to the state but rejected a request for on-going judicial 
supervision of the government's HIV programmes, in the form of a supervisory order. 
The court did display in this case, a greater eagerness to impose extensive financial 
obligations upon the state where it failed to meet the standard of reasonableness 
and in a way allowed some flexibility of application of the reasonableness test. 
The Constitutional challenge was brought by the TAC against the government’s 
policy for limiting the provisions of Nevirapine, a drug useful in preventing mother to 
child transmission of HIV, to a limited number of ‘pilot sites’. This was a public 
interest case and the Court granted a mandatory order against the state which 
would benefit the entire class of HIV positive women giving birth in public 
hospitals98.  The government argued that extending Nevaripine to other public sites 
will be too costly and expensive to maintain.  It is submitted that this was the same 
argument used in the Soobramoney case.  Fortunately the court used a different 
approach.  
The court held that the government programme, in this case, failed the 
reasonableness test and ordered the government to remove, without delay, the 
restrictions that prevented Nevirapine from being made available outside the pilot 
sites and for it to be distributed where medically indicated. The government was also 
required, to extend testing and counselling facilities related to mother-to-child 
transmission (MTCT), throughout the public health sector.  In essence, the court 
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declared the existing government policy available to all. The court wanted 
government to amend or revise its policies if it wished to do so.   
The case accepted that the interests of the individual HIV positive pregnant women, 
and their children, were equal with the general public welfare.  
 
3.2.2.5  Lindiwe Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg & Other: A lost 
opportunity 
 
Keeping in mind the above, jurisprudence followed by a rich academic scrutiny of six 
years, one would expect that the next socio-economic rights case would draw on 
these interpretations and opinions.  The case of Mazibuko found its way to the CCSA, 
with disappointing results. Many objections were indeed raised in the Court’s 
approach by legal writers and socio-economic rights activists.  The judgement was 
received by many as a perfectly missed opportunity to give more substance to socio-
economic rights, with acceptable benchmarks for state duties.  
 
The case considered the lawfulness of Operation Gcin’amanzi, a project the City of 
Johannesburg piloted in Phiri in Soweto in early 2004, to address the problem of 
water loss and the non-payment for water services in Soweto. The Applicants 
succeeded in the South Gauteng High Court. This court found that the pre-paid 
water meters was unlawful and unfair, and held further that the City’s free basic 
water policy was unreasonable and therefore unfair.  The High Court stated that 50 
litres of free basic water daily must be provided to the Applicants and similarly 
placed residents of Phiri.  
However, on Appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, the court varied the order.  
The court granted 42 litres of water per day as “sufficient water” and it also declared 
the pre-paid meters unlawful. The court did not consider whether the manner in 
which the meters were installed was fair.  The Applicants applied to the CCSA for 
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leave to appeal against the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal and in fact 
sought reinstatement of the High Court order.  The Applicants accepted that the old 
water supply system in Soweto was unsustainable and had to be changed. When the 
matter received attention in the High Court, eighteen months had passed and the 
vast majority of residents had accepted, under strain, the pre-paid water system.   
The CCSA held that the obligation placed on government by section 27 is an 
obligation to take reasonable legislative and other measures to seek the progressive 
realisation of the right.  This is the same criteria laid down in the Grootboom case. 
The court considered the question, whether the water policy was reasonable.  The 
court held, in this regard, that it is not appropriate for a court to give a quantified 
content as to what constitutes “sufficient water” because this is a matter best 
addressed in the first place by government99.  
The court held that ordinarily, it is institutionally inappropriate for a court to 
determine precisely what the achievement of any social and economic right entails, 
and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation of the 
right.  The court went further and argued that to investigate social conditions in the 
light of available resources, the legislature and executive are the best places to 
investigate social conditions, to discuss available budgets, and to determine what 
targets are achievable in relation to these rights. 
 According to Liebenberg, it is regrettable that in the Mazibuko case, the court chose 
to place the narrowest possible construction on these criteria and then engage in a 
superficial analysis of the impact of the City’s water policies100. 
In considering other Constitutional Courts such as Columbia, the court recognises the 
difficulties associated with the enforcement of social rights and further 
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acknowledges that these difficulties cannot be ignored101.   The Columbian judges 
recognised the progressive characteristic of the state’s duty to fulfil rights and they 
have to take into consideration, in their interpretive task, not only the limited 
resources but the progressiveness principle as well.  The Columbian court takes into 
consideration the social right that entails public expenditure and they accept that it 
is the duty of the state to determine the ways in which they plan to render service 
and provide subsidies.   Due to this duty, the Constitutional court of Columbia does 
not ignore the vital role that the law plays in the definition of social content and 
protection mechanisms. It means that the court does allow congress ample freedom 
to develop strategies for the satisfaction of these rights.  The willingness by  
Columbia’s judges to be flexible, in their decision techniques to allow for further 
democratic discussion is called for, instead of taking rights away.   
 
In this analysis it is clear that the issue of judicial interference in state duties, in other 
countries, are as visible as in South Africa.  
 
The Mazibuko case, it is submitted failed to address the most crucial issue of socio-
economic rights, which is a long awaited interpretation of the rights normative value 
in a South African context. It is argued that the starting point of the Mazibuko 
judgment was a repeat of the Grootboom standard, nothing new could be drawn 
from it to add to the CCSA’s courts jurisprudence.  
 
The amicus curiae in all of the above cases in this chapter, requested the court to 
implement the minimum core approach as laid down in General Comment 3 of the 
ICESCR.  The court rejected the request.  An in-depth discussion will follow from 
various scholars, providing their support or disagreement with this approach.  As 
noted above, this study does not support a minimum core approach.   
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3.3 The minimum core debate: Does it have a place in South Africa?  
Liebenberg sets out the correct starting point to the minimum core debate in South 
Africa.   She illustrates the importance of the value of socio-economic rights against a 
background that cannot be ignored, which is the purpose socio-economic rights 
holds in the Constitution102.  She believes that the socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence should be seen within the transformative commitments of the 
Constitution. She holds that in this manner, this might lead to an understanding of 
the purposes of socio-economic rights, in the South African context, that goes 
beyond enabling people to survive and fulfil a diversity of purposes.  She argues 
further that, socio-economic rights can also be regarded as integral to advancing the 
constitutional vision of a society based on social justice. According to her, a society 
that values this; is committed to the redress of all forms of systemic inequality and 
disadvantages. It aims to ensure that people have access to social services and 
economic resources necessary to realise their full potential and to participate as 
equals in all spheres of the South African democratic society103.   The question that 
needs to be asked is, whether the minimum core can be considered as a remedy to 
address the infringement of socio-economic rights.  Various views will be analysed 
and criticised in respect of this concept, as some writers do believe that 
implementing a minimum core approach does provide a remedy to the problem.  
According to Bilchitz, survival can be addressed by a minimum core allowance from 
the state104.   Bilchitz’s theory is based on a survival threshold.  Liebenberg rejects his 
views.  Bilchitz argues that the concept of minimum core obligation is a method of 
protecting citizens, and considering their basic necessities to survive, and if these 
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needs are not met, then the citizens’ ultimate survival will cease to exist105.   He 
argues further, that the obligation is on the state, to protect the citizen’s survival.  
He concedes that an individual can only flourish if his or her socio-economic rights 
are met.  He accepts that in order for the state to meet its minimum core obligations 
in socio-economic rights as a matter of urgency, other rights will receive less priority, 
weighing of rights are thus required.  He justifies this notion by stating that the 
obligation of progressive realisation of the right will not meet a satisfactory standard 
unless the minimum essential needs for survival are met106.   It can be argued that 
this idea was facilitated by the Grootboom case, when the court held that the 
standard of reasonableness review requires that government programmes must 
make some reasonable short-term provision, for those whose socio-economic 
circumstances are urgent or intolerable. 
 
Wesson seems to agree with Bilchitz and he has identified three reasons why the 
minimum core should be adopted107.  Firstly it would allow for resources to be first 
allocated where needed urgently. Secondly, it would allow for an understandable 
formulation of the concept of progressive realisation, and this would be the starting 
point for the state. Finally, it has an advantage that would guarantee individual 
entitlements.  He concludes that with all these benefits in mind, the minimum core 
will allow for substantive achievement of a transformative society108.  
 
Wesson’s main criticism against the minimum core, is the fact that the Court 
overlooked the complex relationship between core (those that implicate survival) 
and non-core (those that relate to fulfilling a range of purposes and flourishing as a 
human being) allocations, and the difficulty of balancing these against one another.  
Lehman disagree with Bilchitz  and criticise those who promote the application of 
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the minimum core and she argues that people who promote this core approach, fail 
to provide specification of the core and especially where the minimum core requires 
a ranking of interests. She argues that no principled basis exists on which the court 
can rank the interests of claimants when their interests are incomparable109.  
 
Liebenberg, taking a different critical approach from Bilchitz, accepts that people can 
survive on very little; and to introduce a minimalism for survival purposes is not 
correct where a state has the resources to provide more than the bare minimum110.  
The critical question now asked is; why should a heightened justification be required 
from the state, only in respect of survival interests.  Liebenberg warns against the 
danger of adopting a fixed, overarching standard such as survival, as it will result in 
either over- or under-inclusivity in the specification of core obligations. She further 
states, that if survival is the standard to apply socio-economic rights; which standard 
would then be needed for other goods and services such as the public provision of 
child care, which may not be essential for survival, but is critical in fostering 
substantive gender equality; one of the foundational constitutional values111.   
Liebenberg further disagrees with Bilchitz’s approach, noting that the survival 
standard does not provide clear guidance as to which socio-economic interventions 
should be adopted or enjoyed.  Liebenberg suggests an assessment of the impact on 
the seriousness on the complainant group of the deprivation in question112. 
Young agrees with Liebenberg’s method of interpretation of the minimum core.   
Young concedes that the focus on survival can set the interpretations of economic 
and social rights on the wrong path113. Young criticises the CCSA for its reluctance to 
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give meaning to the minimum core, through a simple expression of values, by merely 
highlighting normative values of dignity, equality, and liberty in guiding its 
interpretation.    
Young clarifies her position by acknowledging that there is a connection between the 
“minimum core” and the “basic needs” required for life and survival. According to 
her, this does focus on urgent steps that need to be taken for the satisfaction of 
those rights. She believes that some competing values that are alongside human 
dignity may also bring about the interpretation of the minimum core; and it is this 
interpretation of the values that should be measured in context with the right the 
Constitution strives to promote114. 
It should be understood, that to value the inherent dignity of human beings as a 
society, is to ensure that the material conditions exist in which people can develop 
their capabilities and participate in shaping their society115.    
Lehman admits that no matter what form of interpretation is used for the “minimum 
core”, it remains both theoretically and pragmatically ill-conceived.  She applauds 
the rejection of the Court’s jurisprudence, in respect of the minimum core in socio-
economic rights cases, and urges that it is inappropriate as a tool of judicial decision-
making.  She accepts that the reasonable approach is the better approach than the 
minimum core, but criticises the Court for not getting involved in the manner in 
which the budget is spent.  She holds firm that the minimum core is inappropriate in 
the context of litigation that relates to the enforcement of an individual’s rights116.   
The onus would be on the state to prove what it can provide, which means that the 
boundary of the minimum core would have a shifting target; its boundaries 
determined by what the state could afford to deliver. 
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Lehman accepts that there is a distinct lack of specificity, in both academics' and the 
CESCR’s comments, on how competing interests should be ranked when the 
minimum core is applied.   Further analysis by Lehman into the CESCR response and 
that of other supporters of the approach, resulted in an acceptance that the 
minimum core requires a ranking of interests. Urgent interests need to be 
prioritised. But on what basis, she asked, are interests to be ranked? How should 
"urgent" interests be distinguished from less-urgent interests? She makes various 
examples and only one is mentioned here to illustrate her point. She asks between a 
family of three in a two-bedroomed house that lacks running water and sanitation, 
and a family of ten squeezed into a two-bedroom house with running water and 
sanitation. How she asks, does one find the answer to these questions within the 
right itself117? These questions go back to the Soobramoney case, where rights were 
limited due to practical issues relating to the scarcity of resources.  
The minimum core debate in other countries, such as Colombia, the Constitutional 
Court openly embraced the minimum core approach in socio-economic rights 
adjudication118. The Court accepted, into its law, the interpretations of the right, as 
laid down by the UN Committee on Economic and Social Rights.  The Constitutional 
Court of Colombia applies the provisions of the International Covenant of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, to interpret its sections.  A number of cases have 
identified the minimum core of socio-economic rights, such as the right to health 
and the right to housing, in view of the CESCR observations.  
In 2008, the Columbia Constitutional court demonstrated its commitment to their 
minimum core obligation by ordering that certain rights in health care should be 
made immediately available119.  The court made it clear that if the treatment needed 
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is not available in Columbia, then provision will be made for abroad treatment.   The 
court adopted a framework for healthcare as specified by the United Nations 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (UN ESC Rights Committee).  The 
Court categorised essential minimum core of the right to health in a mandatory plan 
and a subsidised mandatory plan. These were immediately enforceable. The other 
health care plans were made subject to progressive realisation. Here the court 
considered resource constraints. However, the immediate enforceable minimum 
core section is already considerably resource-intensive. 
Lehman is correct in concluding that the minimum core idea is inherently 
inconsistent and its adoption could lead to an outcome that exacerbates socio-
economic rights’ needs120.  A minimum core strategy may help some poor, but it may 
well be at the expense of other poor people, and this paper cannot support such a 
strategy as a remedy.   
The following discussion, which relates to meaningful engagement, is the Court’s 
latest and perhaps most promising, improvement in ensuring participation in socio-
economic rights.  
 
3.4 Meaningful engagement, providing much needed participation   
3.4.1 The process of engagement 
 
Liebenberg121 promotes meaningful participation and states that it is not only an 
expression of the dignity of the citizen, but is indispensable in ensuring that the 
design and implementation of programmes, to realise socio-economic rights, are 
effective and sustainable.  It is submitted that meaningful engagement is one part to 
the fulfilment of a sustainable remedy to socio-economic rights infringement.  
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The notion of meaningful engagement has its origin in two cases, namely; Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers (PE Municipality)122 and Occupiers of 
Olivia Roads v City of Johannesburg123 (Olivia Road) and this has marked an 
important development in the court’s approach to remedies, in the context of the 
adjudication of socio-economic rights124.  In the PE Municipality case, the 
Municipality requested the eviction of 68 unlawful occupiers, who had occupied 
private, undeveloped land within the Municipality area; in terms of Prevention of 
Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998  (PIE).  The 
CCSA accepted that the court had exercised its discretion in granting an eviction 
order in terms of section 6 of PIE, and by doing so, the courts had to take into 
account, all relevant circumstances which included whether it was “just and 
equitable” to order an eviction and part of this determination was whether there 
was any mediation in terms of section 7 of PIE.  
 
 It is clear that section 26(3) of the Constitution and PIE gives the court a wide 
discretion in eviction proceedings, taking all relevant circumstances into account125.  
The court accepted that the procedural and substantive aspects of justice and equity 
cannot always be separated, and parties should engage with each other to find a 
mutually-acceptable solution126. 
 
In the case of Olivia Roads, the concept of meaningful engagement was developed 
further.  The City started evicting people from several buildings in the City, on the 
grounds that the buildings were unfit for human habitation, were dangerous and 
unhygienic, and by evicting them, would promote their health and safety. This was 
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done by way of an Administrative Action which allowed the City to evict people 
under these conditions.  The people challenged the legality of the process and asked 
the court to intervene.  What followed was a lengthy analysis by the court for the 
parties to meaningfully engage with each other. Although real engagement occurred 
extremely late in the process, it nonetheless was highly effective in obtaining 
substantial relief with genuine commitment to the remedy from both sides. The City 
agreed to cease its eviction attempts and to take specific measures to make the 
existing buildings safer and more habitable by cleaning the buildings, providing 
sanitation services, access to water, and functioning toilets. 
 Yacoob J, referred to the case of PE Municipality, where the requirements of 
meaningful engagement was considered, and he stated that: 
“………..Engagement is a two-way process in which the city and those about 
to become homeless would talk to each other meaningfully in order to 
achieve certain objectives and that Engagement has the potential to 
contribute towards the resolution of disputes and to increase understanding 
and sympathetic care if both sides are willing to participate in the 
process.......... It must make reasonable efforts to engage and it is only if these 
reasonable efforts fail that a municipality may proceed without appropriate 
engagement. It is precisely to ensure that a city is able to engage 
meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or illiterate people that the engagement 
process should preferably be managed by careful and sensitive people on its 
side”127. 
In the Olivia roads case, the court recognised the value of rendering explicit, 
obligations on municipalities, to engage meaningfully prior to instituting an eviction 
order128. The Court located this obligation of the state to act reasonably in section 
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26(2) of the Constitution, and the need to treat human beings with the appropriate 
respect and care for their dignity to which they have a right as members of 
humanity129.  The court extended the scope of the engagement process and held 
that the engagement must have meaning and that the requirements set forth for 
meaning include; existence of good faith, right open-minded attitude, proactive 
stance of the parties and the need to adhere to transparency throughout the 
process130.  The court clearly held that when it is presented with a case where no 
meaningful engagement was done prior to litigation a case for eviction, then a court 
should refuse the eviction order.  This is unfortunately not what happened in the 
Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes131 (Joe Slovo), 
this case will be discussed later. 
Liebenberg supported the requirements set out in Olivia Roads and remarked that 
the order facilitated a participatory, contextualised solution to the impasse which 
had developed around the City132.  However, she provided the same criticism as in 
the Grootboom case, to Olivia Roads, where the court failed to deal with other 
people in the same situation as the Applicants and the court also failed to deal with 
the issue of permanent housing.   
Yacoob J, contentedly conceded that the desperate situation of the occupiers had 
been alleviated by the reasonable response of the City to the engagement process.  
Furthermore, he held that the court respected the undertaking provided by the state 
that they will engage with the Applicants in finding a solution for permanent 
housing133.  Nothing would have prevented the court from providing a supervised 
order in respect of the implementation of these permanent housing engagement 
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plans to all people in the same situation as the applicants.  The court was not willing 
to extend its discussions beyond the Applicant in front of the court.   
It is submitted that the deference the court provided here to the state is unearned, 
taking into account that these meaningful engagements on the initiation of the state 
could have taken place prior to the state seeking the evictions by way of 
Administrative sanction. The Olivia Roads case, even suggested that all of this could 
have been avoided if the City’s Regeneration Strategy Plan had incorporated skilled 
workers to engage with the people prior to the process of eviction becoming an 
option134.  It can be stated at this point, that the most important aspect of the 
development in this case of meaningful engagement, was when the court held that 
in the absence of meaningful engagement, no eviction should be granted135.  
 
3.4.2 The consequence of failed engagement 
  
The concept of meaningful engagement will not always result in a success story. In 
the case of Mamba v Minister of Social Development136, the court failed to resolve a 
dispute with meaningful engagement.   This case deals with the closing of refugee 
camps by the government.  The government portrayed an aggressive attitude and 
refused to engage meaningfully with the refugees.  Ray criticised the court for not 
adhering to the engagement process laid down by Olivia Roads and argued that in 
Mamba, the Court could have held that closure of the camps required a 
reintegration plan but ordered engagement to determine the details of such a 
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plan137.  The outcome would have prevented closure before engagement and 
created the kind of pressure to change policy138.   
 
3.4.3 Failure by the court to create consistency in meaningful engagement  
 
The case of Joe Slovo is a good illustration of how meaningful engagement should 
not take place. Judge Hlope, in the High Court, granted the eviction order, knowing 
full well that the requirement for meaningful engagement, as held in the Olivia 
Roads case, was not met.  Ray explained that Judge Hlope tried to justify this in his 
passing reference to the engagement requirement.  In a parenthetical remark, he 
found that the numerous meetings the City Council held with residents including 
multiple averments in the court papers of meetings and/or consultations that were 
held with the residents of Joe Slovo, indicated that there was a sufficient amount of 
engagements139. Further justification was also made by taking into account the 
bigger picture of the project. From this discussion, it is clear that the judge ignored 
the requirement of meaningful engagement as set out so clearly in Olivia Roads.   
The residents appealed directly to the Constitutional Court.  
 The Joe Slovo informal settlement started in 1989, people invaded land belonging to 
the City of Cape Town on the N2 and M7 road.  By 2008, there were between 18 000 
and 20 000 thousand people in the settlement140.  The conditions of the settlement 
were described as appalling.  People lost their lives in fires and municipal services 
were non-existent, overcrowded conditions, in makeshift accommodation built of 
insubstantial material, and the conditions of life were unhygienic. 
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In May 2004 the “Breaking New Ground” was introduced, which was the 
comprehensive plan for the creation of sustainable human settlement, which 
focused on upgrading of Informal Settlements (UISP).  A three phase process was 
introduced in developing the houses. The residents of Joe Slovo were initially very 
happy with housing policy objectives but very unhappy with the manner in which the 
government went about to achieve these objectives.  Part of the plan was to move 
the residents to Delft, with the view that some residents would be allowed to return 
after the houses were build.  The first phase started and completed, and then the 
people were faced with rental payments which were beyond their means. In the 
second phase, people refused to move and presented evidence to the court that an 
in situ upgrade was possible. The government proceeded to seek an eviction court 
order.  
 The Applicants denied that there was any meaningful engagement with them and 
instead they argued that the government misled and lied to them.  Residents also 
argued that housing developer Thubelisha Homes and government officials had 
failed to adequately include their input in the planning of the project or ensure that 
enough low-income housing would be built to accommodate all residents141.   
The court granted the eviction order on condition that the relocated area needed to 
fulfill certain requirements and that 70% of the current residents must be provided 
houses in the developed area.   After the settlement terms had been put in place, 
the Court then ordered the Government to engage with the residents on the 
specifics of relocation and included a detailed agenda of the items on which the 
residents must be consulted. The Court also retained jurisdiction over the case 
requiring the parties to report the results of these engagements.  
Ray believes that it was an improvement by the court where a more specific agenda 
and stronger oversight was granted. Liebenberg noted that the Court was unwilling 
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to trust the government to formulate details of the relocation to Delft and therefore, 
established specific terms in the order, while using engagement to determine other 
details.  Ray concedes that this form of partial determination of the substantive 
issues can break an impasse in negotiations and also alter the bargaining positions of 
the parties more positively142.   Ironically, the eviction granted in this case, was never 
executed and the government proceeded with in situ upgrades just as the Applicants 
initially requested, this was due to cost implications in moving the people to 
adequate alternative accommodations.  
Liebenberg criticised the Joe Slovo court for retreating from its substantive promise 
of meaningful engagement in the Olivia Roads case, as a key consideration in 
determining whether an eviction was justifiable in the particular case143.   Liebenberg 
questions the Joe Slovo court’s willingness to condone the inadequate consultation 
process and labels it a serious concern.  She nevertheless accepts that even though 
the CCSA’s judgement was normatively weak, it still contained strong remedial 
safeguard in respect of implementing eviction orders.  
A month prior to the Joe Slovo judgment, the court handed down the judgment of 
Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA and Another v Premier of the Province of 
KwaZulu-Natal and Others144, which was another direct appeal to the CCSA in 2009.  
This case reaffirmed the importance of meaningful engagement. The Applicants 
argued that section 16 of the KZN Slums Act145 violated section 26(2) of the 
Constitution in three ways: it precluded meaningful engagement between 
municipalities and unlawful occupiers; it violated the principle that evictions should 
be a measure of last resort; and it undermined the precarious tenure of unlawful 
occupiers by allowing the eviction proceedings to begin without reference to the 
procedural safeguards contained in the PIE Act. The Court ruled that section 16 of 
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the Act was unconstitutional and invalid, as it gave too much power to the MEC and 
seriously undermined the protections in section 26(2) of the Constitution read with 
other housing legislation. 
Certain key findings from the Abahali judgment included the decision that if 
engagement takes place after there has been a decision to institute eviction 
proceedings, it cannot be genuine or meaningful.   Another important finding was 
that proper engagement includes taking into consideration the needs of those who 
will be affected, the possibility of upgrading the area in situ, and the provision of 
alternative accommodation where necessary146.   The court held that proper 
engagement would include taking into proper consideration, the wishes of the 
people who are to be evicted; whether the areas where they live may be upgraded in 
situ; and whether there will be alternative accommodation. This affirms that eviction 
or relocation should only ever occur as a last resort, and only after in situ upgrading 
has been considered. The revised national informal settlements upgrading 
programme, the National Housing Programme reiterates this principle147.  
It is submitted that the above process of engagement took place after litigation was 
instituted, and it had indeed found a well-founded benefit as discusses above. It is 
further submitted that it would be ideal to have these types of engagements prior to 
litigation. The only question that remains is; whether there is a structural forum that 
can address the request for engagement prior to litigation.  
 
3.4.4 Ray’s theory to develop engagement as a structural long-term process 
Ray promotes the theory of political engagement. This entails the development of 
engagement as a structural long-term process in government policies.  He argues 
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that over-reliance on litigation, as a form of engagement, is dangerous148. Political 
engagement, he states, should take place before litigation commences, unless it is 
not possible to do so because of urgency or some other compelling reasons. 
His theory emphasises that extending engagement beyond litigation and turning it 
into an administrative requirement offers the greatest potential for making the 
remedy a meaningful tool for implementing section 26 and other socio-economic 
rights. He suggests that as a result of the Mamba case, it has become important to 
develop engagement as a structural long-term process. He states that this form of 
engagement requires considerable coordination and administrative planning by the 
government.  He recommends and this paper supports this view which, based on the 
engagement process by the court, the City should incorporate a structural 
engagement review process into the inner–city Redevelopment Plan. There should 
be increased agenda control, more direct management and an increased willingness 
to impose sanctions. All represent potentially important innovations in the 
engagement process.  He declares that in both the Oliva Roads and Joe Slovo cases, 
the Court discusses the possibility of political engagement. 
Ray concludes that courts have created engagement as a judicially enforceable tool, 
and in this manner, have crafted a way to demand a voice in policy development. 
 
3.4.5 Cases where meaningful engagement was enforced during 2012  
There were two High Court cases in 2012, where meaningful engagement was held 
to be of utmost importance and they were decided on 21 September 2012 in 
Gauteng High court and 20 August 2012 in the Cape High Court.  
 In the case of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality v Various Occupiers South 
Gauteng High Court Johannesburg149, the judge held that:  
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“It would seem that there were some positive results from this process of 
dialogue although the majority of disputes were not resolved”.  
The case of Shania Amends v Megawatt Sallie Amends Western Cape Court150, this 
matter deals with an individual’s claim, where the judge held that:  
“The circumstances of this case involving as they did, the unfortunate family 
dynamic of a father seeking to evict his three minor children together with 
their mother, cries out one would thought for a solution by way of mediation 
and engagement short of going to court”.   
A further 2012 CCSA case was Schubart Park Residents’ Association v City of Tshwane 
Metropolitan Municipalities 151(Schubart park).  This case was decided on 9 October 
2012. The case dealt with four blocks of flats in the city of Pretoria and about 3000-
5000 people were affected. The building deteriorated and the City was unable to 
identify the occupants due to an increase in urbanisation.  The water and electricity 
supplies to the buildings were stopped152.    A fire broke out on one block and all the 
residents were removed and after the fire was contained, the police refused the 
people access to the buildings. This was the start of an urgent application that 
followed to the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria.  The application was refused but 
the Court ordered temporary accommodation be made available by the City and the 
parties were ordered to meet and draft a proposal. The Court requested an 
engagement process in an attempt to reach an agreement153.  The police continued 
to remove all of the remaining people out of the other two buildings.  On the return 
date of the engagement process, the parties failed to reach an agreement. However, 
the court did confirm some of the agreement for immediate assistance.   The High 
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Court in effect, granted two types of orders; namely a dismissal order and secondly, 
a tender implementation order, that related to the relocation of alternative 
accommodation.  
The parties applied for leave to appeal to the CCSA as leave was refused by the High 
Court and Supreme Court of Appeal.  The Applicants argued that the provisions of 
section 26(3) of the Constitution and the statutory instruments were disregarded 
which allowed for removal, evacuation or eviction of people from their homes154. 
This related to the dismissal order. They further stated that the tender 
implementation order was not proper under section 38 of the constitution. The High 
court, on the other hand, indicated that the dismissal order was granted due to 
safety and temporary impossibility.  
The issue before the CCSA was the request for the restoration by the residents for 
reoccupation of their homes, as they were despoiled of possession of their homes. 
The court accepted that it was the ordinary requirement of spoliation and the 
demand for section 26(3) of the Constitution that was at issue.  
The court continued to consider the issues and referred to the case of Tswelopele 
Non-Profit Organisation v City of Tshwane Metropolitan155 (Tswelopele) who 
confirmed the view of the case of Rikhotso v Northcliff Ceremics (Pty) Ltd156 
(Rikhotso), that spoliation orders under common law, accepts that impossibility is a 
defence available for a spoliation order.  The CCSA found that a constitutional law 
interpretation is required and considered the Supreme Court of Appeal’s findings in 
Rikhotso, who emphasise that a remedy is needed that would vindicate the 
Constitution.   Kriegler J profoundly held that:  
“The remedy we grant should aim to instil recognition on the part of the 
governmental agencies that participated in the unlawful operation, too, are 
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bearers of the constitutional rights, and that official’s conduct violating those 
rights trampled not only on them but on all… ….the occupiers should therefore 
get their shelter back”157. 
The CCSA cautioned the making of an order, under section 38 of the Constitution, 
where people were removed and a spoliation application was brought to court.  A 
declaratory order the court held would be preferred where the court will not provide 
immediate relief for restoration and furthermore, that a refusal to order re-
occupation does not mean that a foundation can now be laid for lawful evictions 
under section 26(3) of the Constitution. The court found that such an order should 
be temporary and subjected to revision.  
This court accepted that it is not only eviction cases where meaningfulness is 
important, but in cases such as this where people are deprived of their homes and 
restoration of their homes are required. The dismissal order was found to be 
appropriate in the circumstances. However, the court accepted that the High Court 
could not have ordered immediate restoration but did indicate that the court could 
have made a declaratory order for eventual entitlement to restoration.  
The court reaffirmed the principles of PE Municipality and Olivia Roads, where it was 
held that the exercise of competing rights and interest are best resolved by 
engagement between the parties. The CCSA in the Schubart Park case was unhappy 
with the City’s engagement process of the City’s tender, as it was seen as a unilateral 
process where the City decided on when, for how long and whether all of the 
Applicants may return to Schubart Park158.   The court held that the order, in term of 
section 38, should provide for meaningful engagement with the Applicants being 
involved at every stage of the re-occupation process. A supervised order was 
appropriate on the facts.  
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3.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has illustrated the vagueness of reasonable review presented in the 
Grootboom case and its failure to provide substantive reasoning to socio-economic 
rights.  The assessment of progressive realisation of these rights in the reasonable 
reviews of government policies has brought us no closer to any consistency of 
procedure.  This has been illustrated in the TAC case, where the court failed to 
interfere with the contents of government policy.  However, it touched on how 
government should go about allocating its budget in future programmes but it fell 
short of granting a supervisory order to make sure that there is a fulfilment of this 
request.  The court has not attempted to develop substantive reasoning for socio-
economic rights and when provided with the opportunity in the Masibuko case, it 
firmly established its lack of understanding the need for effective remedies in socio-
economic rights adjudication.  
The request for a minimum core was rejected in all of the CCSA cases and rightfully 
so.   Bilchitz’s theory fell short of a long-lasting effect of socio-economic rights.  In his 
analysis, he argues that the minimum core is important for survival of the poor, and 
with the implementation of this theory, he accepts that certain rights will have to be 
considered more important than others.  Consequently, in terms of his theory, 
certain disadvantaged people will have to stand in line, in order for other 
disadvantaged people to be assisted first. This is a theory that both Liebenberg and 
Lehman reject for good reason. As stated elsewhere, this paper promotes the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights that will create consistency and sustainability 
from generation to generation.  The application of the “minimum core” will merely 
have an effect of placing a plaster on an open wound; immediate relief with short- 
term effects.   
The courts have been faced with a state that fails to enforce its declaratory and 
mandatory orders meaningfully. The need has arisen for the court to become more 
robust in its interpretation to ensure effective enforcement of its orders and the 
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introduction of the concept of “meaningful engagement” in the evictions cases is a 
welcomed development.  It is especially this type of development that is much 
needed in socio-economic rights cases. Even though Olivia Roads was a form of 
successful engagement, the Joe Slovo case failed to continue a consistency in this 
approach.  This being said, the courts have taken acceptance in this approach.   
The case of Schubart Park has established that the concept of meaningful 
engagement is also important where the state deprives one of occupation in certain 
situations of emergency and failed to engage in the process of restoration.  This case 
reaffirms the duties on the state to provide and to facilitate continuous engagement 
in all of the processes of fulfilling people’s socio-economic rights. The supervisory 
order attached to this engagement, will provide a long lasting effect on the needs of 
the residents of Schubart Park.  
It can be argued with certainty, that meaningful engagement is one means to create 
some fulfilment of socio-economic rights and the courts should continue to embrace 
this concept. Where reasonable review fails to address policy content issues, 
meaningful engagement addresses it head-on.   
Due to the imbalance in power of the parties, the concept of meaningful 
engagement is but one leg that may be added in creating a remedy that is effective.  
The next chapter will consider this suggestion more fully incorporating further, the 
structural interdict and supervision of court orders. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STRUCTURAL INTERDICTS AND THE EFFECT OF SUPERVISORY ORDERS 
4.1  Introduction 
Historically, interdicts were used as a last resort when no other remedies were 
available.  The law on interdicts has been influenced by English law and with specific 
province in the English law of equality159.  Christopher Mbazira agrees that in socio-
economic rights cases, structural interdicts should also be used only as a last 
resort160.  There exist a number of criticisms against the use of the interdict but this 
chapter will illustrate that those criticisms are overstated, by illustrating the 
structural and practical use raised by this interdict. Yet, as will be demonstrated, the 
balance is more in favour of granting the interdict due to its effective remedial 
nature for socio-economic rights.  
Swart agrees that structural interdicts seem to be the most appropriate remedy in 
socio-economic rights cases of extreme urgency due to the programmatic nature of 
socio-economic relief161.  She concedes that prohibited and declaratory orders 
cannot be compared to the effect of structural interdicts, as they lack an on-going 
supervisory function. She makes reference to the TAC and Grootboom cases which 
bounced back to court due to the lack of supervision in its orders. She promotes 
structural interdicts due to its nature and accepts that socio-economic rights, in the 
context of constitutional commitment do require supervision to assist with 
governments’ inaction of orders162.  The violation of socio-economic rights, she 
understood, cannot be remedied by and order that has a once-and-for -all effect and 
litigants are normally poor and cannot come to court over and over.   However, 
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Liebenberg points out that as much as the purpose of the structural interdict is to 
ensure compliance with the terms of the order, its broader purpose is to facilitate 
the process of engagement between the parties, as discussed in chapter 3163.  Both 
Mia and Liebenberg understood the importance of crafting effective sustainable 
remedies in a socially progressive constitution, where the courts must take care of 
the most vulnerable.  
Extending the view of Liebenberg, one of the main purposes of this study, in terms of 
promoting structural interdicts and supervisory orders, is first to ensure compliance 
with effective court orders and secondly, to promote engagement in policy content 
decisions for current and future drafting of policies, by all parties concerned as a 
result of a litigation before the court.  In this way, other people in the same position 
as the parties, in front of the court, will be protected via the drafting of the new 
policies. Furthermore, the engagement will result in an understanding of the 
normative interpretation of the right in its context.  This result has been sought for, 
from the inception of the first CCSA case.  
This chapter will be divided into four sections.  The first section introduces the 
characteristics of a structural interdict with its supervisory function.  Thereafter a 
discussion will follow as to the reasons why the courts have been reluctant to use 
this remedy. The third section will examine the extent of the effectiveness of the 
remedy in the current position of South Africa, while the fourth section will provide 
the possible defects in the remedy and some possible solutions thereto. Lastly, an in-
depth discussion will follow on how South African courts can embrace the remedy to 
its fullest, by identifying a set of elements which will create the basis for when to use 
the remedy.  
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4.2  Characteristics of a structural interdict 
 
A structural interdict is defined as a continuing process, where the court will provide 
periodical directions regarding the process of remedying a violation of Constitutional 
rights, and there will be ongoing supervision164. Currie and de Waal identified five 
requirements associated with structural interdicts165. Firstly the court will declare 
that the government’s conduct is in violation of its Constitutional obligation.  The 
court will then proceed and instruct government to comply with its obligation. A 
positive instruction would follow where the court orders government to produce a 
report, under oath, over a period of time, stipulating how they intend to address this 
violation.  The Applicants are then allowed to respond to the report and lastly, the 
matter is set down for hearing with the view to make such a report, part of the court 
order.    
The court has however extended these requirements made by Currie and de Waal, in 
its case law. The case of Olivia Road has added a sixth element, namely that the 
parties must have meaningfully engaged before the state submits its plans to the 
court.  Liebenberg agrees and states that the court created this foundation of 
meaningful engagement attached to the supervised order, to define the goals to be 
achieved, with the view to cure the violation. What follows during this process is the 
most intense and practical process of negotiation by all parties, as a plan needs to be 
developed to meet the goals. Finally the plan, and its approval, is subjected to on-
going supervision. The reason for on-going supervision will become clearer, later in 
this chapter.  
One of the main functions of this structural interdict is the flexibility allowed by the 
court and the required deference the court express to the state. It presents the state 
with enough latitude to formulate, implement and monitor the plan by way of 
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deliberative negotiation between the parties, organs of states and other 
stakeholders.  
 Currie and de Waal however, caution the court not to allow the terms of the 
interdict to be too flexible, which will result in supervision becoming too intrusive.  
The concerns expressed, relates to the supervised court order interfering with the 
day-to-day business of government, and the court may find it difficult to remove 
itself166.  Ebadolahi has provided a partial solution to the concerns raised by Currie 
and de Waal. She suggests that the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) 
assist with the supervision of orders167.   Liebenberg agrees, but goes further and 
suggests that nothing prevents the court from appointing independent experts or 
preferably interdisciplinary teams of experts, to assist with the supervision of 
structural court orders168.  The High Court can also assist with the supervision.   
 
4.3 Reasons illustrated by the courts for not using structural interdicts as an effective 
remedy 
In the Grootboom case, the court granted a mandatory order however; the 
requirements of the court order were not mandatory in nature. The government was 
placed under an obligation to provide shelter to children who, together with their 
parents, had been left homeless. The obligation was held to extend to the provision 
of shelter to their parents. The court made an order declaring the obligations of the 
respondents, and ordered them within three months to report to the court on the 
implementation of the order. An exchange of commentary and replies followed by 
the parties, and a date was to be set for ‘consideration and determination’ of the 
report, commentary and replies. Strangely though, the court did not make any 
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specific order on the government to complete anything in relation to shelter. The 
court merely declared the nature of the right and the obligation169.  
It was clear in the Grootboom case that the states over-extension of the separation 
of power doctrine and the general deference the court has shown the other 
branches of government, has resulted in the court’s failure to provide effective 
remedies. Swart is correct when she states that a court wants to settle cases once 
and for all.   She accepts that a structural interdict might give the courts a different 
functional understanding, as understood traditionally, but it is something the court 
can embrace. However the remedy is seen as necessary, surrounding the 
problematic nature of socio-economic rights enforcement. The TAC case failed, on 
request from the applicant, to provide a supervisory order but said that it could be a 
possibility, where it is appropriate for the court to consider a supervisory jurisdiction.  
The Mazibuko case, as discussed fully in chapter 3, has illustrated how the court has 
missed out on an opportunity to give the right, the much needed normative 
interpretation. Also, it is believed that the court has over-extended the doctrine of 
separation of powers here.  It is clear that the court opted for a conservative 
approach.  The amicus had raised several points in their submissions to the CCSA, 
which justified the granting of a structural interdict with a supervisory jurisdiction. 
They submitted that the City’s water policy is flawed as it does not allow for people, 
who ran out of water, to make representation for further allocation170. They accept 
that the new system of representations allocated, has been designed to address this 
problem, but there is no evidence of how it will work, whether it will be accessible to 
the poor, how long it will take between making the special representations and 
water being available on tap, or how much additional water will be given if the 
representations are successful. They further submitted that evidence has shown that 
the City has an extraordinary capacity for foot-dragging and that it does not know 
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what the flaws or weaknesses will be, in the implementation of the new policy.   The 
failure on the CCSA’s side to recognise the importance of a supervisory order, in 
these circumstances, is alarming and presents reasons for concern. It is well 
understood why the decision was greeted with dismay by socio-economic rights 
activists, community organisations and a wide range of actors working on the right 
to water 
After the Grootboom case, a rich academic jurisprudence in debates was established 
and there was indeed an expectation that the Mazibuko court would take cognisance 
of concerns, problems and possible suggestions raised.   
Ebadolahi, summarised some of the crucial observations by critics in respect of the 
courts reluctance to provide suitable relief to these fundamental rights. Firstly, the 
doctrine of separation of powers has been considered the most important 
observations by many critics. Furthermore, the vagueness in the Constitution of the 
rights and enforcement costs has obstructed the South African judiciary’s effort to 
enforce socio-economic rights, meaningfully171.   It remains the duty of the court 
though to provide substance to the right and to create a proper enforcement of the 
right through appropriate relief. She introduces a two stage approach for change; 
one is an increase in using structural interdicts and secondly, an advanced, 
collaborative role for the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) to 
monitor the supervisory172. She recommends that the assistance the SAHRC can 
provide government is to help formulate plans and to follow up on the 
implementation of the plan, after an order has been granted. Furthermore, the 
commission can assist the court in identifying weaknesses in the potential plan of 
the government, to the court; and make proposals and suggestions.  The commission 
will thus have an advisory and a supervisory function, depending on the issues 
before the court.   The court must be cautious, not allowing the commission to take 
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over the functionary role of the court, as this will result in the court merely 
becoming a rubber stamp.  This is where the importance of the correct attitude from 
all parties becomes relevant. The aim should always be on finding a workable, 
practical and sustainable solution to the violation at issue.   
The characteristic of the structural interdict in the first section of this chapter, has 
illustrated that this remedy would protect the doctrine of separation of powers, 
without minimising the right.  One of the main functions of this structural interdict is 
the room allowed by the court, or the deference the court express to the state. This 
presents the state with enough latitude to formulate, implement and monitor the 
plan by way of deliberative negotiation between the parties, organs of states and 
other stakeholders.   With this in mind, there should be no holding back by the court 
to use the remedy to its full potential.  
4.4 The extent of the effectiveness of the remedy 
A structural interdict is a remedy to eliminate the systematic violation that is found 
in institutional and organisational settings. It will adjust the future performance of 
the state departments, and it provides on-going government performance to supply 
relief. The structural interdict calls for government to restructure its internal 
structural organisation, to give effect to its obligation. This request for change has 
been incorporated into the constitutional values173. 
Abadolahi illustrates the positive effects of a structural interdict.  She accepts that it 
will avoid the difficulty of the doctrine separation of powers problem; as the plans 
presented to the court will be prepared with the assistance of the appropriate 
political role players.  The plans are then scrutinised by the court in order to consider 
compliance with Constitutional provisions. The order will ensure accountability from 
the correct government department. This is important as the officials are able to 
identify which departments are responsible, to ensure the fulfilment of certain 
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services and rights.  Furthermore, the order will provide the court with valuable 
insight into the functionality of governmental departments and its challenges. Lastly, 
the order will provide for a more fundamentally fair outcome in comparison to other 
remedies174. 
The effectiveness of this remedy can indeed be democratic as it allows for a dialogue 
which strengthens accountability, participation and respect between the judiciary, 
government and its citizens. The High Court has identified the accumulative value in 
the remedy; one major accomplishment is the continued deference the court can 
give the state with the doctrine of separation of powers. There should be no further 
resistance from government to enforce these orders as they will be involved in the 
process of formulating the order175.   
The dialogue that this remedy creates can restore some of the hostility that has been 
visible in the state’s attitude towards the judiciary, when other remedies were used. 
The notion of dialogue is not a new idea.  Dixon states that this concept has received 
attention in Canada, the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom for 
decades; even though it is not so familiar in socio-economic rights cases176.  It does, 
however, promote the theory of co-operative constitutionalism.    
The case of Olivia Road further illustrates the benefits of this interdict.  It was the 
High Court who recognised the desperate need of the people for housing. 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to accept the High Court’s judgment and an 
eviction was granted.  The CCSA realised the negative effects of government’s 
housing policies and was satisfied that a supervisory jurisdiction is needed, and 
granted an interim structural interdict. A process of meaningful engagement 
followed between the parties.  The engagement process also resulted in the parties 
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providing the solutions and the court merely measured its reasonableness.  This 
interim relief can only be sought in negative rights, thus restraining government 
from taking away an existing right until a final decision is reached. Highlighted again 
here, is the strong collateral effect structural interdicts possess.  
 
4.5 Defects in the remedy and possible solutions  
Ebadolahi, along with many others, admit that structural interdicts do have their 
defects.  The main issue being cost in supervised orders of government planning; as 
this can lead to excessive enforcement cost, resource diversion or waste. Another 
concern raised is the lack of implementing the plan after it has been approved by the 
court.   The consequence may well be that litigants find themselves in the same 
position prior to the order being granted, and contempt proceedings are 
complicated and time consuming.  It has been said that these defects can undermine 
the judiciary’s credibility.  
The active role judges have to play in the supervised process, according to Mbaziro, 
could be detrimental if the court is not cautious. He states that the task of the court 
may appear administrative in nature, which might seem to affect the impartiality and 
independence of the judge177. This is unfortunately the nature of the structural 
interdict and judges must make room for the state to provide possible remedial 
strategies themselves; and only interfere when absolutely necessary via its 
supervised process. Despite this, Mbaziro suggests that judges must just make sure 
that their decisions are realistic, just, and impartial and supported by reasons178.   A 
fully reasoned judgment will avoid a minimalist approach as this will weaken the 
criticisms.   
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Furthermore, the concern of limited resources may result in the court continuing to 
avoid these orders which require further judicial supervision, without additional 
institutional support from other participants179. It is now appropriate at this point of 
the study to introduce Liebenberg’s possible solution that addresses resource 
allocation at the appropriate forum and in the same solution also silence the 
infringement of separation of power critics that structural interdicts have gained.    
Liebenberg promotes the “experimental remedial approach” as described by Charles 
Sabel and William Simon, from the United States, as the possible solution180.    This is 
a type of structural interdict that facilitates the experimentalist remedial approach.  
This approach, Liebenberg describes, has a different functionality compared to the 
features of judicial remedies which have as its characteristics, an approach of finality 
and command-and-control.    
The concept of experimentalism advance, in this study, is to illustrate the broader 
understanding of how socio-economic rights should be dealt with in the future, for 
its fulfilment.   The study promotes an idea that government will, by way of 
institutional changes; deal with socio-economic rights via an administrative process.  
This would be possible where the court has already established the foundation and 
the benchmarks of these rights to the government in its jurisprudence.   The 
experimentalist remedial approach, as defined by Sabel and Simon, will start from an 
appointed centre, such as government or a government agency, which is a centre 
that will oversee the function and performance of the administrative processes 
associates with the implementation of human rights and social welfare181. The 
ambitious role of the experimentalist approach will help the state to regulate by way 
of regulations; social welfare, and human rights issues.  Experimentalism highlights 
the involvement in which central government provides a broad discretion to local 
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administrative units.  In this manner there will be a continued measure and 
assessment of administrative performance in ways designed to encourage 
continuous learning and the revision of standards. This will certainly assist with the 
growing territory of policy areas, characterised by uncertainty about, both the 
definition of the relevant problem and its solution. 
The concept of experimentalism will help to solve many of the current socio-
economic problems as the aim of this approach is to accommodate continuous 
change and variations that are observed in challenged public problems.  Policies 
should thus be experimental in nature, in the sense that they will be considered 
subject to constant and well-equipped observations of consequences.  The policies 
will also be subjected to ready and flexible revision in the light of the observed 
consequence and this can then be addressed182.   The monitoring body, which is the 
centre, will pool information in disciplined comparisons, and create pressures and 
opportunities for continuous improvement at all levels.  This will enhance careful 
thinking engagement among officials and stakeholders.    The fact that the revision of 
framework goals, performance measures, and decision-making procedures are 
periodically revised will assist in measuring performance and identify problems. This 
process mainly strives to ensure accountability of administrative action183.  
It is submitted that the approach by Sabel and Simon creates enough space for 
respect between the functionally of the judiciary and the state.  The fact that the 
state is allowed to define its own measures to achieve its goals through a 
participatory process, are much more effective than a final order184.  The 
transparency that these orders create will be welcomed, as it promotes 
accountability and sensitivity towards the needs of the claimants and openness in 
the state’s attempts to address the violation.   
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Liebenberg strongly promotes the “experimentalist” structural interdicts as the 
emphasis is on collaborative dialogue and the function of these interdicts will 
facilitate long-term structural reform, a concept this study promoted from the 
outset185. 
Wim Trengove was correct when he said that socio-economic rights violations may 
be remedied by a variety of means and he also promotes structural and institutional 
reform over a period of time. He accepts that it is the court’s responsibility to assist 
with the prevention of the violation, by any means necessary186.     
In his theory, he first discusses foreign court methods of enforcement, where 
government has shown a reluctance to cooperate. The discussion, will illustrate that 
these countries will not be prevented from implementing and authorising structural 
changes to ensure fulfilment of fundamental rights. Countries such as India, the 
United States and Canada follow a robust approach in dealing with fundamental 
rights infringements.  Where it has been established in these countries that a right 
has been breached by the state, the state is allowed an opportunity to indicate how 
it intends to fulfil its obligation. The courts in these countries will issue an order 
directing the legislature and executive branches of government to bring about 
improvements, described in terms of their objectives, and the court will obtain a 
supervisory jurisdiction to supervise the implementation of those improvements.  If 
the state parties fail to bring an improved plan to court; then the court will, with the 
help of the other parties and court experts, draft its own plan.  This is to ensure 
compliance when the state is reluctant to comply with the court’s request.  A 
negative effect will result, as the court will be writing policies and it is not their 
domain to do so. However, if the court accepts that this is the only means to give 
effect to a violated right, it will do so. Unlike in South Africa, the failure to adhere to 
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a court order could result in contempt of proceedings; but this is not an effective 
alternative.   
 The CCSA jurisprudence has demonstrated that they will under no circumstances, 
interfere with government policy-making. However the above discussion has 
demonstrated well, that with the supervisory element attached to a structural 
interdict and the process of meaningful engagement, the court does not need to 
concern itself with interfering in policy decisions. The structure and nature of the 
structural interdict will deal with this issue.  
 
4.6 Embracing the remedy: Some elements to identify 
The previous sections illustrated the importance of the practical implications and 
effectiveness of structural interdicts and their supervisory functions. This section will 
provide guidelines to the court, to help identify certain elements in cases with the 
view of understanding when it will become relevant to make use of this type of 
relief.  A range of factors are identified by Mbazira that describe structural interdicts 
as the most creative of the remedies considered by the CCSA in socio-economic 
rights cases187. He accepts that the use of structural interdicts goes beyond the 
traditional perception of the role of the courts, and he correctly states that the 
judges must take a position which makes them participants in the dispute.  It is this 
change in role that has created many debates in the legal sector; mostly questioning 
whether this relief can be considered an appropriate relief.  The above sections have 
dealt with the answering this question.  
Mbazira provides the court with some norms, principles and procedural guidelines 
associated with structural interdicts188.  He accepts that the norms must be capable 
of application in various contexts.  They include the use of structural interdicts only 
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when necessary. The structure of the order should be flexible and divided into 
smaller portions to ensure participation of all the effected stakeholders, ensuing in 
promoting, impartiality, independence and transparency.  
From this discussion of Mbazira it can be argued that his principles may be 
considered the foundation on which the elements that will be discussed must rest.   
Roach and Budlender present the first element; when it comes to the court’s 
attention that a lack of capacity or lack of competency exists in government, then it 
will become important for government to submit a plan and advise the court on how 
they intend addressing the issues189. The other party must present evidence to the 
court that shows a possibility that the government may not comply promptly. In the 
case of S v Sibiya v Director of Public Prosecution190, a 2006 case, where the court 
dealt with government’s slow pace to replace the death penalty with an appropriate 
sentence, after the Makwanyana case in 1995 ruled the death penalty as 
unconstitutional. The court felt it appropriate in the Sibiya case to continue to 
supervise its order until the process was complete, as it had a serious impact on the 
group.  Similarly, in N v Government of the republic of South Africa (No.1)191, the High 
Court recognised the measures adopted to assist the prisoners with anti-retroviral  
treatment, as unworkable, and characterised by delays, obstacles and restrictions. 
The court felt that a structural interdict was warranted as the failure would seriously 
compromise the health of the prisoners.   
The second element was identified in the Olivia Road and N v Government of the 
Republic of South Africa cases; where it is clear to the court that if the parties in front 
of the court are in desperate need of relief, a structural interdict should be granted. 
The engagement between the parties may result in the state adopting plans to first 
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address the desperate needs.  There could also be a need for the state to refrain 
from acting, pending a final order and an interim structural interdict will assist.  
The next element relates to; when it come to the court’s attention that the violations 
that the court is dealing with does not only affect the parties in front of the court , 
then the granting of a structural interdict in this situation is to make sure that the 
state includes those people in their policy drafts as future beneficiaries.   In the Olivia 
Road case, where it was clear that there were people in other buildings, with similar 
issues as the Applicants, the court could have instructed the state to include those 
people in its engagement process.   The Mazibuko case with its inflexible and unclear 
water policy implementation procedure and processes would have certainly 
qualified. 
The final element for consideration is; where the court finds itself unable to make a 
decision due to a lack of sufficient information of a technical or substantive nature, 
or where the court is uncertain as to how long the process of engagement will take.  
This element is supported by the case of the Schubart Park Residence Association 
case192.  The court accepted that the meaningful engagement in respect of the re-
occupation process will be a long process and that it is necessary to supervise the 
process; but that the High Court will take the supervisory role.  
This section has provided much insight into the characteristics, functionality and 
defects of the structural interdict and it can be said with confidence that all the 
defects raised have been cleared to an extent that make this type of order more 
attractive than those granted in previous cases. From the above discussion, it would 
appear that the creative use of the structural interdict is well-identified in the 
elements that have been raised, coupled with the meaningful engagement process 
and the supervision of the order. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
It chapter has fully demonstrated, how effective structural interdicts and supervisory 
orders can be to fulfil compliance by the state to court orders.  This type of order 
was compared to the jurisprudence of the previous court orders and it has been 
found to be much more effective and reliable. The ancillary effect that these orders 
have is irreplaceable, in view of the fact that meaningful engagement is part of the 
supervisory requirement. With this in mind it allows for much needed clarity in 
future policies of government relating to socio-economics rights.  
This chapter has further set out the characteristics and effectiveness of supervisory 
orders demonstrating that with proper time frames in place for meaningful 
engagement, a process of finality can be reach faster.  It has been accepted that the 
defects in the structural interdicts and supervisory orders remedy related mainly to 
cost but this is a natural consequence of these types of orders and not much weight 
should be attached to it in a democratic state, where participation is key.  
The benefits outweighs the defects outright, and one such benefit is that it 
addresses the doctrine of separation of powers creatively, as the court is merely 
allowing the state time and room to present its own solutions to socio-economic 
rights but only in a more creative manner. The result of this paper is achieved if 
these creative manners of operation provide the much needed fulfilment of socio-
economic rights.  
Further, this chapter presented useful guidelines to the court to take into 
consideration when to use supervisory orders, this will also present the state with 
prior insight into what the courts will be looking out for, when using the remedy of 
structural interdicts with supervisory orders. In essence it is submitted that these 
guidelines also present a normative value to socio-economic rights.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
When considering meaningful constitutional remedies, it must be asked meaningful 
to whom, to those whose socio-economic rights has been infringed or to 
government who has to enforce these rights.  It is submitted that the word 
“meaningful” will find a different description depending on the party being 
promoted. 
This has been demonstrated in the above discussion.  It has become important, in 
the jurisprudence of socio-economic rights, that innovative and creative remedies 
must be developed by the courts that recognise the challenges inherent in enforcing 
socio-economic rights, while still preserving the ability of courts to play a role in 
ensuring that these rights are not merely empty promises. 
It is for this very reason that this paper has systematically pointed out the path the 
court’s jurisprudence has developed in its implementation of various constitutional 
remedies in socio-economics rights cases and presented criticisms for certain of its 
interpretations.  
It is submitted that the court’s failure in the outset of its jurisprudence to define a 
normative concept for socio-economic rights, is the core reason why this right has 
failed to find an identity of its own.  What followed is the court’s reluctance to 
provide clear court orders to the state when the court merely granted vague orders 
by way of declaratory and mandatory orders. Even though the TAC presented a 
positive outcome, the court’s reluctance to provide supervisory jurisdiction is 
indicative of a courts historical nature to finalise the matter once and for all for.  
The development of reviewing government’s policies to establish reasonable review, 
has shown to be ineffective in the Grootboom case, it is submitted that the notion of 
reasonable review and progressive realisation are merely excuses used by 
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government to prolong fulfilling the much needed socio-economic rights of 
marginalised citizens.   Liebenberg has emphasised on many occasions that what is 
needed in socio-economic rights is assuring equal sustainable distribution.  
Promoting structural interdicts with a supervisory jurisdiction as stated in chapter 4, 
is to ensure that the courts exercise a watchful eye over the fulfilment of socio-
economic rights.  The process of meaningful engagement will always be an element 
to these types of orders and this, in essence, will ensure participation from all parties 
concerned. This was well demonstrated in the Olivia Road and much later in the Joe 
Slovo cases.   
It is submitted that the views of Liebenberg and Lehman regarding the concept of 
“minimum core” is supported, as Lehman correctly pointed out when she said that 
minimum core is an inappropriate tool for judicial decision making.   
It is recommended, that with the guidelines stipulated in chapter 4, the courts will be 
in a position to identify certain criteria in each case and when faced with any one 
mentioned in chapter 4, the court needs to consider using the structural interdict 
with a supervisory order as a possible remedy.  Considering the entire positive 
effects the remedy has on fulfilling socio-economic rights and the consistence it will 
create amongst the courts,  this remedy have proved itself throughout this paper to 
be the much needed creative and effective remedy required in socio economic right 
violations.   
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